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公 法 评 论 惟愿公平如大水滚滚，使公义如江河滔滔！ |
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
BEIJING 2001
政治哲学国际学术研讨会
北京 2001
I
APRIL 27-29，2001
2001年4月27-29日
BEIJING, CHINA
中国 ? 北京
Sponsoring & Organizing Bodies:
主办单位：
Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
中国社会科学院哲学研究所
Philosophy Summer School in China: China Britain Australia
中英澳暑期哲学学院
Co-sponsoring & Organizing Bodies:
协办单位：
School of Public Administration, Soochow University
苏州大学公共管理学院
School of Public Administration, Yunnan University
云南大学公共管理学院
Funding Body:
资助单位：
The Ford Foundation
福特基金会
Honorary President 会议名誉主席：
RU Xin 汝 信
President 会议主席：
XING Bensi 邢贲思
Chair, International Advisory Committee 国际顾问委员主席：
Sir Marrack GOULDING
Chair, Programme Committee 学术委员会主席:
Nicholas BUNNIN
Chair, Organizing Committee 组织委员会主席:
QIU Renzong 邱仁宗
General Secretary 秘书长：
JIANG Yi 江 怡
SUN Jing 孙 晶
CONTENTS
目 录
Programme -------------------------------------------------------------------（5）会议日程--
Abstracts---------------------------------------------------------------------（16）
论文摘要
List of Participants----------------------------------------------------------(115)
与会者名单
PROGRAMME
会议日程
PROGRAMME
会议日程
Thursday 26 April 2001
09:00 – 20:00
Registration
注册
Lobby, Jianguo Gardens Hotel
好苑建国酒店
Friday 27 April 2001
08:30 – 12:00
Registration
注册
Front Hall, Conference Room
会议室前厅
Friday 27 April 2001
09:00 – 09:30
Opening Ceremony
开幕式
Chair: Li Deshun
主持人：李德顺
09:00 – 09:12
Xing Bensi
邢贲思
President, Philosophy Summer School in China: China Britain Australia (PSSCCBA)
中英澳暑期哲学学院院长
09:12 – 09:18
Andrew Watson
Representative, The Ford Foundation in Beijing
福特基金会北京代办处主任
09:18 – 09:24
Li Pengcheng
李鹏程
Deputy Director, Institute of Philosophy, CASS
中国社会科学院哲学研究所副所长
09:24 – 09:30
Nicholas Bunnin
Chair, British Committee, PSSCCBA
中英澳暑期哲学学院英方委员会主席
Friday 27 April 2001
09:30 – 10:30
Plenary Session I: Keynote Speeches
第一次全体会议：基调报告
Chair主持人: Nicholas Bunnin
09:30 – 09:50
Philip Pettit
Democracy as a Two-dimensional, Republican Ideal
作为二元的、共和理想的民主政体
09:50 – 10:10
Li Pengcheng李鹏程
An Outline of Philosophy of the Oriental Neo-Communitarianism
“东方新社群”理念哲学论纲
10:10 – 10:30
Discussion
讨论
10:30 – 10:40
Tea Break
休息
Friday 27 April 2001
10:40 – 12:00
Plenary Session II: Justice & the Rule of Law
第二次全体会议：公正和法治
Chair: Julia Tao
主持人：陶黎宝华
10:40 – 11:00
Thomas Pogge
Economic Justice, National and Global
经济正义：国家的与全球的
11:00 – 11:20
Li Qiang 李 强
Issues of Social Justice in Economic Transition
经济转型中的社会正义问题
11:20 – 11:40
Gu Su 顾 肃
On Fundamental Principles and Factors of the Rule of Law
论法治的基本特征和要素
11:40 – 12:00
Discussion
讨论
12:00 – 14:00
Taking Picture & Lunch Break
照相和午餐
Friday 27 April 2001
14:00 – 17:15
Group Session A：Justice
分组会A：公正
Chair: Zhang Xiaoming Chen Youhong
主持人: 张晓明 陈幽泓
14:00 - 14:15
Dong-jin Jang
In Searching of Justice for Global Society: A Comparison of Political Liberalism and Confucianism.
寻求全球社会的正义：政治自由主义和儒家思想的比较
14:15 – 14:30
Byron Kaldis
Justice and Democracy across National Borders: Ethics or Politics?
跨越民族国家疆域的正义与民主制：伦理还是政治？
14:30 – 14:45
Hon-Lam Li
Marx, Justice, and Capitalism
马克思，正义和资本主义
14:45 – 15:30
Discussion
讨论
15:30 – 15:45
Tea Break
休息
15:45 – 16:00
Catriona McKinnon
Social Justice: Rights, Obligations, and Self-Respect.
社会正义：权利、义务和自尊
16:00 – 16:15
Gao Quanxi 高全喜
Constitutional Justice and Transcendental Justice--Two Kinds of Justices and their Paradox
宪政正义与超验正义——两种正义及其悖论
16:15 – 16:30
Wang Shouchang 王守昌
The Conception of Justice and History of Justice’s Doctrine
正义概念及正义学说的历史
16:30 – 17:15
Discussion
讨论
Friday 27 April 2001
14:00 – 17:30
Group Session B：(1) Public Reason & the Rule of Law
(2) Equality
分组会B：(1)公共理性与法治
(2)平等
Chair: Li He Cheng Lian
主持人: 李 河 程 炼
14:00 - 14:15
Lu Feng卢 风
Public Reason And Democracy
公共理性与民主
14:15 – 14:30
Ahmet Kara
A Paradox of Rationality in a Liberal Pluralist Democracy
在自由的多元民主政治中的理性悖论
14:30 – 14:45
Sheng Chin-lai 盛庆琜
Some Moral Arguments against Unrestricted Capitalism
反对无限制资本主义之若干道德论证
14:45 – 15:00
Kang Phee Seng江丕盛
The Limits of Public Reason
公共理性的界限
15:00 – 15:15
Melissa S. Lane
On What Can't Be Replaced: Compensation, Security, and the Rule of Law
论那些不能替代的因素：赔偿、安全保障和法治
15:15 – 16:00
Discussion
讨论
16:00 – 16:15
Tea Break
休息
16:15 – 16:30
Susan Hurley
Why the Aim to Neutralize Luck Cannot Provide a Basis for Egalitarianism
为何使机会均等的努力不能为平均主义奠定基础
16:30 – 16:45
Jeremy Moss
Equality and Enablement
平等与能力授予
16:45 – 17:00
Alois Nugroho
Quality and Equality: the Role of Statesmanship in a Democratic State
品质与平等：民主制国家中政治家的作用
17:00 – 17:30
Discussion
讨论
Saturday 28 April 2001
08:30 – 10:20
Plenary Session III: Rights
第三次全体会议：权利
Chair 主持人：Alan Montefiore
08:30 – 08:50
James Griffin
First Steps in an Account of Human Rights
人权的基本问题
08:50 – 09:10
Lin Yu-sheng 林毓生
A Dialogue between Kant and Confucius and Mencius Concerning Human Rights
康德与孔孟之间关于人权的对话
09:10 – 09:30
Will Kymlicka
Nation-Building and Minority Rights
民族国家建制与少数民族的权利
09:30 – 09:50
Han Zhen韩 震
On Historicity and Ideality of Human Rights with Comments on A. J. M. Milne’s Philosophy of Human Rights
论人权的历史性和理想性—兼评米尔恩的《人权哲学》
09:50 – 10:20
Discussion
讨论
10:20 – 10:35
Tea Break
休息
Saturday 28 April 2001
10:35 – 12:00
Plenary Session IV: (1) Equality
(2) Confucianism & Constitutionalism
第四次全体会议：(1) 平等
(2) 儒家与宪政
Chair: Chien Yung-hsiang
主持人：钱永祥
10:35 – 10:55
Xu Youyu 徐友渔
A Review of Several Arguments of Equality
关于平等的当代思考
10:55 – 11:15
Zhang Qianfan 张千帆
Confucianism and Constitutionalism: On the Social and Political Functions of Li
儒学与宪政：论礼治的政治与社会功能
11:15 – 11:35
Qian Xun 钱 逊
The Idea of Democracy in Ancient China
关于中国古代民主思想
11:35 – 12:00
Discussion
讨论
12:00 – 14:00
Lunch Break
午餐
Saturday 28 April 2001
14:00 – 17:00
Group Session C：(1) Rights
(2) Governance
分组会C：(1) 权利
(2) 治理
Chair: Liao Shenbai Wang Yanguang
主持人: 廖申白 王延光
14:00 - 14:15
Michael Freeman
Culture, Sovereignty and Human Rights
文化、主权和人权
14:15 – 14:30
Stephen Angel
Toward a Cross-Cultural Dialogue on Rights and Interests
关于权利和利益的跨文化对话
14:30 – 14:45
Jens Hinkmann
Philosophical Justifications of Human Rights
人权的哲学辩护
14:45 – 15:30
Discussion
讨论
15:30 – 15:45
Tea Break
休息
15:45 – 16:00
Mollindo Charabarti
Democracy and Autonomy: Does Property Rights Regime Matter?
民主制和自治：产权体制是否紧要？
16:00 – 16:15
Dudley R. Knowles
Legitimacy
合法性
16:15 – 17:00
Discussion
讨论
Saturday 28 April 2001
14:00 – 17:15
Group Session D：(1) Liberty
(2) Truth
分组会D：(1) 自由
(2) 真理
Chair: Jiang Yi Liu Xin
主持人: 江 怡 刘 莘
14:00 - 14:15
Jiwei Ci 慈纪伟
Freedom as a Subjective Condition of Justice
自由：作为正义的主观条件
14:15 – 14:30
Zheng Yujian 郑宇健
Negative Liberty and Limits of Reason -- a Critical Comment on the Agonistic Interpretation of Berlin’s Liberalism
消极自由和理性的局限—对伯林自由主义的规避主义诠释的批评性评论
14:30 – 14:45
Chen Wentong陈闻桐
Freedom and Equality in Modern Western Political Philosophy
近现代西方政治哲学中的自由和平等
14:45 – 15:00
Gong Qun龚 群
On Ideas of Liberty in Rawls’ Theory of Justice
论罗尔斯的自由理念
15:00 – 15:45
Discussion
讨论
15:15 – 16:00
Tea Break
休息
16:00 – 16:15
Allan Montefiore
The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals
知识分子的政治责任
16:15 – 16:30
Juha Raikka
Freedom of Expression and the Argument from Truth
言论自由和真理论证
16:30 – 17:15
Discussion
讨论
19:00 – 20:30
Workshop for Participants Speaking Chinese: Political Philosophy and China
研讨会(工作语言为中文)：政治哲学与中国
Chair: Qiu Renzong
主持人：邱仁宗
Sunday 29 April 2001
08:30 – 12:00
Group Session E：Community & Diversity
分组会E：社区与多样性
Chair: Hu Xinhe Zhai Xiaomei
主持人: 胡新和 翟晓梅
08:30 - 08:45
David Archard
Community and Political Good Order
共同体和良好的政治秩序
08:45 – 09:00
David Kahane
Democratic Deliberation in Diverse Societies
多元社会间的民主商议
09:00 – 09:15
Daniel Kofman
Sovereignty, Cosmopolitanism, and Their Limits
主权、世界主义以及它们的限度
09:15 – 09:30
Kwan Kai-man
A Critical Evaluation of the Debate between Michael Sandel & the Later John Rawls
论桑德尔与后期罗尔斯的争辩
09:30 – 10:15
Discussion
讨论
10:15 – 10:30
Tea Break
休息
10:30 – 10:45
Dietmar von der Pfordten
Normative Individualism and Normative Collectivism in Political Philosophy and International Ethics
政治哲学和全球伦理中规范的个人主义和规范的集体主义
10:45 – 11:00
Tan Sor Hoon
Liberty vs. Community - A Confucian Perspective on Democracy's Dilemma
自由与共同体：从儒家思想视角审视民主制的两难困境
11:00 – 11:15
Daniel Weinstock
The "Reasonable" as a Limit on Pluralism in Liberal Democracies
在自由主义的民主政治中“理性的”作为多元主义的限度
11:15 – 12:00
Discussion
讨论
Sunday 29 April 2001
08:30 – 12:00
Group Session F：(1) Citizenship
(2) Perspective on Political Philosophy
分组会F：(1) 公民
(2) 政治哲学
Chair: Wang Xiaosheng Lu Feng
主持人: 王晓升 卢 风
08:30 - 08:45
Catherine Audard
Citizenship and Moral Individuality
公民和道德个体
08:45 – 09:00
Chen Youhong陈幽泓
Self-Governance and Political Order: the Role of Citizens
自主治理与政治秩序――公民的角色
09:00 – 09:30
Discussion
讨论
09:30 – 09:45
Tea Break
休息
09:45 – 10:00
Discussion
讨论
10:00 – 10:15
Tea Break
休息
10:15 – 10:30
Cressida Heyes
Criticism from Within and Without: Wittgensteinian Reflections
内部批评和外部批评：维特根斯坦主义的思考
10:45 – 11:00
Katia Vanhemelryck
Pragmatism and Politics
实用主义与政治
11:00 – 11:15
Zhang Boshu张博树
Dramaturgical Action: An Analysis from the Perspective of Political Philosophy
剧场行为：从政治哲学的观点看
11:15 – 11:30
Vincent Shen 沈清松
11:30 – 12:00
Discussion
讨论
Sunday 29 April 2001
14:00 – 15:00
Plenary Session V: Perfectionism & Virtue
第五次全体会议：至善与德性
Chair 主持人：Dietmar von der Pfordten
14:00 – 14:20
Joseph Chan
Political Perfectionism: Ancient and Modern
政治至善论：古典的和现代的
14:20 – 14:40
Julia Tao陶黎宝华
Beyond Proceduralism: The Chinese Perspective on Sincerity as Political Virtue
超越程序主义：中国人对诚实即政治德性的观点
14:40 – 15:00
Discussion
讨论
Sunday 29 April 2001
15:00 – 16:00
Plenary Session VI: People & Citizens
第六次全体会议：人民与公民
Chair 主持人：Thomas Pogge
15:00 – 15:20
Yung-hsiang Chien钱永祥
Some Critical Reflections on the Concept of ‘the People’ in Political Discourse
关于“人民”概念的一些哲学反思
15:20 – 15:40
Ren Jiantao 任剑涛
From People, Citizens to Voters
从人民、公民到选民—政治活动主体定位与社会政治格局的关联性
15:40 – 16:00
Discussion
讨论
16:00 – 16:10
Tea Break
休息
Sunday 29 April 2001
16:10 – 17:10
Plenary Session VII: Institutions
第七次全体会议：体制
Chair: Ni Huifang
主持人：倪慧芳
16:10 – 16:30
Keping俞可平
Toward An Incremental Democracy and Governance: Chinese Theories and Assessment Criteria
增量民主与善治―中国人对民主与治理的一种看法
16:30 – 16:50
Mao Shoulong 毛寿龙
An Institutional Analysis of the Relationship between Knowledge and Practice in the process of Political Development in China
从中国政治发展的进程透视知识与实践的制度基础
16:50 – 17:10
Discussion
讨论
Sunday 29 April 2001
17:10 – 17:30
Closing Ceremony
闭幕式
Chair: Qiu Renzong
主持人：邱仁宗
17:10 – 17:25
Nicholas Bunnin
Conclusions & Reflections
结论与反思
17:25 – 17:40
Li Pengcheng
李鹏程
19:00 – 20:30
Farewell Party
告别宴会
ABSTRACTS
论文摘要
Toward a Cross-Cultural Dialogue on Rights and Interests
Stephen Angel
Wesleyan University, USA
In a ground-breaking article, the American philosopher and legal scholar Randall Peerenboom has argued that contemporary Chinese human rights theorists understand rights as a kind of interest. He contrasts this with the view of many American philosophers that rights are deontological, rather than utilitarian. As Peerenboom would no doubt acknowledge, though, rights and interests may have more complex inter-relations than his simple framework suggests. Spelling out these different possible relations will help us to understand what Chinese rights theorists may be saying when they link rights and interests. I show that Chinese theories can be understood along lines similar to Joseph Raz's rights theory which, I argue, is in certain ways superior to the Western theories on which Peerenboom focuses. I also suggest that Raz's alternative Western theory is vulnerable to the objection that it obfuscates the point of talking about rights at all; it can seem that talk of interests and duties may be sufficient. I conclude by urging that Chinese theorists can help Raz to respond to this objection, even while themselves learning from other aspects of Raz's view.
关于权利和利益的跨文化对话
斯蒂芬·安格尔
美国卫斯理大学
在一篇开创性的文章中，美国哲学家和法学家兰迪·帕伦勃（Randall Peerenboom）论证说，当代中国的人权理论家把权利理解为利益的一种类型。他以许多美国哲学家的观点来反驳这种见解，那些观点认为权利属于义务，而不属于功利。当然，帕伦勃坦率地承认，比起他简略的结构所表明的，权利与利益之间可能存在更复杂的内在关联。详细解释这些可能的关联将有助于我们理解中国权利学者把权利与利益联在一起的意思。我试图表明的是，中国人的理论可以理解为类似约瑟夫·罗兹（Joseph Raz）的权利理论，而在我看来，后者在某种意义上是优越于帕伦勃所强调的那些西方理论的。我也指出，罗兹的替代西方理论在下述批评面前是很脆弱的，这种批评认为罗兹的理论使得对权利的谈论在意义上显得含混不清，似乎只需讨论利益和义务就足够了。我的结论是：中国的理论家可以帮助罗兹回应这些批评，当然中国的理论家自己可以学习罗兹理论的另外一些方面。
Community and Political Good Order
David Archard
University of St Andrews, Scotland
The most plausible communitarian criticism of Rawlsian liberalism - versions of which can be found in Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, and Michael Sandel - holds that liberalism is unable to supply the principle of political community which is needed if the liberal political order is to be, in Rawls's phrase, well-ordered, that is regulated by principles of justice which all citizens know to apply, accept, and are motivated to comply with. The liberal response is that there cannot, given the fact of pluralism, be a political community if this means 'a society governed by a shared comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine' (Rawls, 1993, 42). There can however be a common aim, namely that of promoting and protecting just institutions. To many critics such an account is inadequate and the idea (to adopt Habermas's phrase) of mere 'constitutional patriotism' motivating political good order seems insufficient.
Two alternatives suggest themselves. One is the use of existing salient communities, such as nationalities, to supply the necessary civic 'fellow-feeling'. Such is the approach of David Miller and Yael Tamir. The other is to offer a plausible account of how citizens might acquire a sense of justice sufficient to underpin the required good liberal order. The paper reviews both possibilities and the problems attendant on each. In particular, in the case of the first the major problem is the extent to which those facts which do unite some body of citizens can themselves be subject to regulation by liberal principles. In the case of the second alternative the major problem is the extent to which the acquisition of a sense of justice would require a particular kind of education and a regulation of the private, especially familial, sphere of social life – in ways seemingly inconsistent with liberal principles of neutrality and legal minimalism.
共同体和良好的政治秩序
大卫·阿查德
苏格兰圣安德鲁斯大学
对罗尔斯自由主义的来自社群主义最有力的批评形式可以在米歇尔·瓦尔茨（Michael Walzer）、查理士·泰勒（Charles Taylor）和米歇尔·桑德尔（Michael Sandel）那里找到，这些批评认为自由主义不能提供政治共同体的原则，而如果自由主义的政治秩序是“秩序良好的”（这是罗尔斯的术语，自由主义的政治秩序即由被公民所接受，应用和倾向于服从的正义原则所控制的政治秩序），则政治共同体的原则是必需的。自由主义的回应就是，在多元主义的背景下，不可能存在政治共同体，如果政治共同体意指“一个由广泛分享的宗教的、哲学的或道德的信条所统治的社会”（罗尔斯，1993，42）的话。不过，仍然可能存在共同的目标，也就是促进和保护公正的公共机构。对许多批评者来说，罗尔斯这种论述是不充分的，并且，按照哈贝马斯的术语，单单是“宪政爱国主义”这个理念来促进良好政治秩序是不够的。
两种替代方案被提出来。其中一种是利用现存的主要的共同体，如民族，来提供必要的公民的共同意识。这是大卫·米勒（David Miller）和耶勒·塔米尔（Yael Tamir）的途径。另一种方法是为公民如何获得正义感提供一种可靠的叙述，而这种正义感足够为所期待的良好的自由秩序提供基础。本论文评论了这两种可能选择和它们各自的问题。第一种方案的主要问题是，这些实际上整合公民的因素在何种限度内是遵循自由主义原则的控制的。第二种方案的主要问题是，正义感的获得在何种程度上需要一种特殊的教育和对社会生活的私人领域尤其是家庭领域方面的干预——而这看来与自由主义的中性原则和有限法治主义是不一致的。
Citizenship and Moral Individuality
Catherine Audard
Department of Philosophy, London School of Economics, UK
This paper aims at examining and discussing the relations between citizenship and moral individuality in contemporary liberal and Republican traditions, in particular French and British. Very few political theories would deny the link existing between citizenship and the individual's moral needs, beliefs and dispositions that make up her moral individuality, the personal virtues that individuals normally develop among family and friends. Most would recognise that the virtues of the citizen proceed from or interact with the ideals of a moral individuality and the corresponding dialogical competences (Habermas, Scanlon) that are fashioned within the non-political sphere, but still colour the political realm. Most will insist, as John Rawls does, on the necessity of a 'political' conception of the person as an element of a theory of democracy and, more importantly, of its stability. Indeed, there exist many possible links: citizenship can be seen as a protection for the flourishing of moral individuality and of moral development in the sense of John Stuart Mill, or as a constraint on individual freedom which should be kept as limited as possible, as in the libertarian view of the minimal state. It can, differently, be contrasted with the lower 'private' virtues and interests and be seen as the ultimate expression of moral excellence in a long tradition starting with Aristotle and ending up with the Rousseauist conceptions of civic virtues or with Hegel's conception of 'objective morality'.
However I will show that, on the whole, most current representations tend to separate 'public' and 'private' moral spheres in ways that jeopardize any sense of the unity of the Self and the citizen. The poverty of current conceptions of the moral individual in political philosophy makes it difficult to ground any kind of serious commitment to democracy. What is required, by contrast, is a notion of self-identity, such as narrative identity in the sense of Ricoeur, that is rich enough to explain commitments and responsibilities towards the good polity in the long term. This might lead, of course, to supporting new specific rights, such as cultural rights, minority rights, collective rights, allowing for moral diversity and pluralism, but on grounds different from the communitarian claims.
The paper will (1) explain the moral content of citizenship both for the liberal and the Republican representations, and criticize both conceptions. (2) insist on the value of cultural membership and moral traditions for the flourishing of moral individuality, especially for the constitution of a narrative identity, and discuss ways to bridge the divide between 'private' and 'public' spheres. (3) detail the dimensions of moral individuality concerned with citizenship: the connections between self-interest or partiality and the common good, the role of civic recognition for self-identity, self-respect and self-esteem (A.Honneth, A.Margalit, C.Taylor), the conflict between pluralism and solidarity, etc. (4) suggest new conceptions of rights and duties connected with these aspects of moral individuality, and a new enriched conception of
citizenship and civil society.
公民和道德个体
凯瑟林·奥达特
英国伦敦经济学院哲学系
本论文试图考察当代自由主义和共和传统中（尤其是在法国和英国范围内）公民和道德个体的关系。很少有理论否认在公民资格和个体的道德需要、道德信念和道德倾向之间存在的关系，而后者构成道德上的个性，即个体一般在家庭和朋友中发展出来的个人德性。绝大多数理论承认公民德性是道德个体的观念以及相应的辩证法能力（哈贝马斯、斯坎伦(Scanlon)）的延续或与之相互影响，而后者虽然主要是表现在非政治领域，却仍然将其色彩投射在政治领域中。如约翰·罗尔斯一样，多数人试图坚持政治上的个体概念的必要性，以作为民主制度理论尤其是其稳定性的基础。的确，许多可能的关系是存在的：在约翰·斯图亚特·穆勒的意义上，公民资格可以看作是对道德个体成长或道德发展的一种保护；对主张有限国家的自由主义者来说，公民资格是个体自由的一种限制，因而应当尽可能的予以限定。相反地，公民资格也可以与较低的私人德性和利益的相对照，而被看成是道德完善的最终实现，这表现在以亚里士多德开始而以卢梭的公民德性或黑格尔的客观道德概念告终的漫长传统中。
然而，我想表明的是，从总体上讲，绝大多数当前的理论倾向区分“公共的”和“私人的”道德领域，而这种区分是以一种会威胁到自我和公民的统一性的方式进行的。在政治哲学中流行的道德个体概念的贫乏使得很难为任何一种对民主制度的严肃的忠诚奠定基础。与之相对照，所要求的是自我统一性的概念，如利科意义上的描述的统一性概念，这种概念在长远意义上内涵丰富，可以解释对良好的政体的忠诚和义务。
这篇论文将（１）解释自由主义和共和主义理论的公民概念的道德内容，并对之提出批评。（２）坚持文化和道德传统对道德个体成长的价值，尤其是对描述的统一性的价值并论述沟通在“私人的”和“公共的”领域之间的鸿沟的方法。（３）详细论述道德个体对公民资格的重要性：自我利益或排他性与共同福利的关系，公民认同对自我统一性，自尊的作用（A.哈里斯(A.Honneth),A.玛格利特（A.Margalit）,C.泰勒），多元主义和社会连带主义之间的冲突，等等。（４）提出与道德个体这些上述方面相连的权利和义务的新概念，以及公民和市民社会的新的更丰富的概念。
A Confucian Democracy for the Twenty-First Century
Daniel Bell
Department of Social & Public Administration
City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
In the eyes of Singapore elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew, a "Confucianist view of order between subject and ruler helps in the rapid transformation of society ... in other words, you fit yourself into society -- the exact opposite of the American rights of the individual." A modern Confucian society, that is, can provide the benefits of rapid economic growth, but it must sacrifice the democratic political rights which make government so difficult in the West. For a society reflecting on its political future, the possibilities seem to come down to two options:
Either Western democracy or Confucian authoritarianism.
Let us instead imagine that Western and Confucian political values need not be undamentally incompatible. It is rather tempting, in fact, to conceive of the possibility of reconciling the Confucian emphasis of rule by a wise and uncorrupted political elite with the democratic values of popular participation, accountability, and transparency. But this is easier said than done. What are the political institutions of a modern Confucian democracy? Either elected politicians rule, or an educated elite rules, but how can both rule in the same society? This essay proposes an answer to this dilemma: a bicameral legislature with a democratically elected lower house and an upper house composed of representatives selected on the basis of competitive examinations.
Part I develops the argument that modern democratic regimes have an interest in accommodating the value of rule by an educated elite. Part II considers and rejects alternative proposals for combining democracy with rule by an intellectual elite such as plural voting schemes and functional constituencies. Drawing upon the ideas of radical seventeenth-century Confucian political thinker Huang Zongxi, Part III sketches out the proposal for a bicameral legislature with a democratically elected lower house and an upper house composed of representatives selected on the basis of competitive examinations.
二十一世纪的儒家民主政体
丹尼尔·贝尔
香港城市大学社会与公共管理系
在新加坡政界元老李光耀眼中，“关于臣民和治理者之间的秩序的一种儒家的观念在急遽的社会转型中很有助益…换句话说，能帮助你适应社会——社会即美国式的个体权利的对立面”。也就是说，现代儒家社会能够提供快速经济增长所带来的好处，但却必须牺牲民主的政治权利，而这些权利在西方也使得治理极为困难。对于一个思考着自己政治前景的社会而言，似乎存在着两种可能的选择： 要么是西方的民主政体要么是儒家的权威主义。
然而让我们设想一下，或许西方的和儒家的政治价值观并非完全不可协调的。事实上，设想这种可能性是很有诱惑的：调和儒家的和民主的政治价值，前者强调由智睿而清廉的政治精英统治，后者则注重普遍的参与、责任和透明性。当然这个说来容易做起来难。现代儒家民主政体的政治机构是怎样的呢？要么是选举产生的政治家治理，要么是由受过良好教养的精英统治，然而在同一个社会中由两者共同治理，这是如何可能的？本文为此困境提供一种答案：一种两院制的立法机构，包括由民主选举产生的下院和由竞争式考核基础上选择的代表构成的上院。 第一部分进一步论述下述观点：现代民主政体倾向于容纳精英治理这种价值观。第二部分考察和驳斥另外的选择，即通过多元选举机制和功能选区等方式来调和民主制和精英治理的做法。通过利用十七世纪激进的儒家政治思想家黄宗羲的思想，第三部分会勾画出两院制立法机构的建议，即由民主选举产生的下院和由竞争式考核基础上选择的代表构成的上院。
Republican Citizenship: A Qualified Critique
Daniel Bell
Department of Social & Public Administration
City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Philosophers such as Aristotle and Rousseau argued that ordinary citizens should be active participants in the political life of their community, and that they should be motivated by the common good, not by their own particular interests. This classical ideal of republican citizenship assumes (a) that the state can control the community's own destiny and (b) that people strongly identify with their own political community.
In the modern world, however, both these assumptions can be questioned. Regarding (a), the problem is that "the state is too small for the big things and too big for the small things." On the one hand, environmental disasters, regional economic upheavals, humanitarian crises, and major security threats often seem to require transnational solutions. On the other hand, welfare aid and development projects often seem to require decentralized political arrangements that give local communities and ethnic groups more political control over their own affairs.
Regarding (b), competing allegiances also seem to pull away from the state in opposite directions. On the one hand, highly educated professionals, successful entrepreneurs, and internet surfers often feel more at home among foreigners with similar interests than with their own co-nationals. On the other hand, modern states seem to be breaking up into competing centers of identity focused on ethnicity and race.
In short, the ideal of republican citizenship might seem obsolete. In his recent book, Citizenship and National Identity (Polity, 2000), David Miller courageously argues otherwise. This essay will critically evaluate Miller's defense of republicanism for contemporary liberal-democratic states. I will present arguments from three different perspectives -- liberalism, socialism, and communitarianism -- against Miller's conception of republican citizenship. Liberals will raise doubts about the feasibility of republican citizenship in the modern state, and socialists and communitarians will raise (different) questions concerning the desirability of this ideal. I will conclude by sketching a qualified ideal of republican citizenship that meets objections from all three perspectives.
共和政体的公民：一种有限度的批评
丹尼尔·贝尔
香港城市大学社会与公共管理系
亚里士多德和卢梭等哲学家认为普通公民应当是他们所在的共同体的政治生活的积极参与者，并且这样做的动机应当是出于共同福利，而不是出于私利。这种共和政体的古典概念预设了（a）国家能够控制共同体自身的命运，（b）人们非常认同他们所在的政治共同体。
然而在现代世界，这两个假定都是能够被质疑的。因为（a）问题在于“国家对许多大问题显得力不从心，而对许多小问题则又显得冗余”。一方面，环境灾难、地区经济动荡、人道主义危机和主要的安全威胁常常需要超国家的解决方法。另一方面，福利援助和发展规划等经常需要非集权式的政治安排，而这需要给予区域共同体或民族团体对其自身事务更多的政治控制。
（b）替代性的忠诚也由对立的方向从国家中分离开来。一方面，受过良好教养的专业人士、成功的企业家以及互联网冲浪者经常在有共同兴趣的外国人而不是本国同胞那里找到更多的认同感。另一方面，现代国家似乎倾向于分裂为以种族和民族认同为核心的竞争单元。
总之，共和政体的公民这种理念似乎是过时的。在他最近的著作《公民与国家认同》中（政体，2000），大卫·弥勒（David Miller）却坚定地持相反意见。本文将批判地评估弥勒对现代自由民主国家中共和主义的辩护。我将从三种视角提出论点来反对弥勒的共和政体的公民这种概念——自由主义，社会主义和社群主义。自由主义者质疑在现代国家中共和政体的公民的可行性，而社会主义者和社群主义者则怀疑这种理念是否值得追求。我将勾勒出一种有限度的共和政体公民的概念以回应从三种视角提出的批评。
Is Republican Citizenship Appropriate for the Modern World?
Daniel Bell
Department of Social & Public Administration
City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Philosophers such as Aristotle and Rousseau argued that ordinary citizens should be active participants in the political life of their community, and that they should be motivated by the common good, not by their own particular interests. However, this classical ideal of republican citizenship assumes the context of small face-to-face communities where citizens treat each other as friends, not as strangers with potentially conflicting interests. In the modern world, it does not seem realistic to expect that strangers from different classes and ethnic groups will care enough about each other's fate to allow for this kind of friendly interchange in the political realm.
Contra these doubts, the influential political theorist David Miller argues that nationality can provide the sense of mutual trust and common identity for the ideal of republican citizenship to be realized in contemporary states. This essay, however, will present arguments from three different perspectives -- liberalism, socialism, and Confucian communitarianism -- against Miller's conception of republican citizenship. Liberals will raise doubts about the feasibility of republican citizenship, and socialists and Confucian communitarians will raise (different) questions regarding the desirability of this ideal. I will conclude by sketching a qualified ideal of republican citizenship that meets objections from all three perspectives.
Democracy and Autonomy: Does Property Rights Regime Matter?
Mollindo Charabarti
Centre for Studies in Rural Economy, Appropriate Technology and Environment
Department of Economics, St. Joseph's College, India
Sustainable management of resources in general and natural resources in particular cannot be ensured in an institutional vacuum. One of such institutional requirements is a properly defined property rights regime over the concerned resource. Available literature suggests that private property rights regime can ensure optimum use of resources in the presence of 'complete set of perfect markets'. Unfortunately in countries like India, markets are neither complete, nor are they perfect. Such arguments have come in handy to prescribe a 'State' managed forestry sector in the country. Continuing the legacy of the colonial times, the Forest Department has been managing the forestry resources of the country single-handedly. The recent experimentations with Joint Forest Management (JFM) in most of the states notwithstanding, one is apprehensive of the approach's ability to bring in the people into the fold of management. Such apprehensions result from the absence of a democratic decision making mechanism regarding the use of forestry resources. The absence of such mechanism has resulted in the failure to develop a well-defined property rights regime on the forests in India. Incidentally, the demands for right to self-determination have been observed in parts of the country that are rich in forests. The present paper is an attempt to show that these regions have remained backward because of a faulty developmental policy followed in this country that subsidized the resource poor regions at the cost of the resource rich regions. Such subsidization occurred due to lack of 'democratic' institutions, which if existent, could have been effective in channeling people's aspirations in the desired directions. The experiences out of the agitation for a separate state of 'Gorkhaland' in the eastern Himalayan region have been analyzed to develop a tentative functional relationship between the management practices vis-a-vis forests and the escalation of tensions in this region in demand for right to self-determination.
民主制和自治：产权体制是否紧要？
莫林多·恰拉巴蒂
印度圣约瑟学院经济学系
农业经济特种技术和环境研究中心
资源尤其是自然资源的可持续性管理不能在制度真空中得到确保。所要求的制度之一就是对所关涉到的资源的一种恰当的产权体制。可资利用的著述认为，在“一个完全而又完善的市场体系”中，私有产权体制能确保资源的最佳配置。然而，不幸的是，在像印度这样的国家中，市场体系既不是完全的，也不是完善的。因此，这方面的争议有助于规定一个由各邦管理的林业领域。作为殖民时代的遗产和延续，林业部独自管理着这个国家的林业资源。然而，在大多数邦所进行的“联合林业管理”（JFM）实验却对各邦将民众纳入统一管理的能力表示忧虑。这种忧虑源于在林业资源的利用方面缺乏一个民主的决策程序。这种程序的缺乏使得印度没有发展出一种清晰的林业产权体制。偶尔地，林业资源丰富的地区会提出拥有自主权利的要求。本文就是试图表明，这些地区由于这个国家实行的错误的发展政策而处于落后状态，而这些政策就是以牺牲资源丰富的地区来补贴资源贫乏的地区。这种补贴政策之所以发生，是因为缺乏民主的机构，而如果存在这些民主的机构，就能沿着恰当的方向引导民众的抱负。本文分析了东喜马拉雅地区夹可哈兰邦（Gorkhaland）的骚乱过程，以在这个地区的林业管理实践和因为要求自主权利而导致的紧张局势的加剧之间建立一种实验性的机能关系。
On Taylor's Argument for an Unforced World Consensus on Human Rights--
A Critical Review from the Perspective of Confucianism
Jonathan Chan
Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong
In a recent article, Charles Taylor has proposed a framework that makes the following tripartite distinction: norms of conduct, legal forms and background justifications. On the basis of this framework, Taylor tried to argue for "a genuine, unforced international consensus on human rights." On Taylor's view, an unforced world consensus on human rights would be something like the following: "[D]ifferent groups, countries, religious communities, and civilizations, although holding incompatible fundamental views on theology, metaphysics, human nature, and so on, would come to an agreement on certain norms that ought to govern human behavior. Each would have its own way of justifying this from out of its profound background conception. We would agree on the norms while disagreeing on why they were the right norms, and we would be content to live in this consensus, undisturbed by the differences of profound underlying belief."
In other words, the consensus in question would be something like a convergence on the norms of human rights from out of very different philosophical and spiritual backgrounds. What we need to do is to distinguish between the norms of human rights and their underlying justification. Only a convergence on the norms is necessary. Their background justifications can be very different. That is to say, these convergent norms may be justified in very different underlying spiritual and philosophical outlooks. Furthermore, these norm, according to Taylor, have to be distinguished and analytically separated not just from the background justifications, but also from the legal forms that give them force.
In the above, I have sketched briefly Taylor's argument for "a genuine, unforced international consensus on human rights." If that argument were to succeed, it could provide a strong reason for grounding political theory in the norms of human rights. However, I am skeptical about that argument. In this paper, I shall raise some objections to Taylor’s argument. It is, nonetheless, instructive to note that I do not mean that the notion of "overlapping consensus" is problematic. I am skeptical only about its application to human rights. My main reason for this skepticism is that the norm of human rights is not philosophically neutral and therefore cannot be entirely separate from its philosophical background. It will be argued that it implies a certain moral outlook that is inconsistent with the moral outlooks of other traditions such as that of the Confucian tradition.
论泰勒的非强制性普世人权一致性的论证
——从儒家视角的批评
乔纳森·陈
香港浸会大学宗教与哲学系
在最近的一篇文章中，查理士·泰勒（Charles Taylor）在其提出的思想中作出了三元划分：行为规范、合法的表现形式以及作为背景的正当性。在这种构架的基础上，泰勒试图论证“在人权上的一种诚实的、非强制性的普世一致性”。在泰勒看来，一种非强制性的人权普世一致性应当是这样的：“不同的群体、国家、宗教共同体和文明尽管在神学、形而上学、人性等问题上有根本上不可调和的种种观点，但仍然能在人类行为应当遵循的某些规范方面达成一致意见。当然不同的群体会以不同的方式从自身复杂的背景观念中给予这些规范以正当性。我们可以在这些规范上取得一致意见而在为什么这些规范是正当的这一问题上保留各自的观点；我们应当满足于在这种限度的一致性内生存，而不至于被其背后复杂的信念的差异弄得烦乱不安。” 换句话说，泰勒的一致性就是各种极为不同的哲学或精神背景在人权规范上的趋于一致。我们所需要做的就是区分人权规范和作为其基础的正当性。只有规范上的一致性是必需的，它们作为背景的正当性可以是完全不同的。也就是说，这些一致的规范可以在极其不同的哲学或精神观念中获得正当性。并且，按泰勒的观点，这些规范不但应该与正当性问题区分开来，而且也应当与给予其强制性的合法表现形式区分开来。 上面我简要勾勒了泰勒关于“在人权上的一种诚实的、非强制性的普世一致性”的论点。如果泰勒的论述是成功的话，那么它将为把政治理论奠基于人权规范这种做法提供强有力的理由。然而我怀疑这种论点，在本文中我将对泰勒的论述提出一些反对意见。注意到这一点可能是有用的：我并不是说“（在行为规范上）重叠的一致性”这个概念是成问题的。我只是怀疑这种一致性对人权的实际应用。我怀疑的理由是：人权规范在哲学上并非中立的，因此不能完全从其哲学背景中分离开来。本文将论述的是：人权规范这个概念意味着特定的道德观念，而这种特定的道德观念与象儒家那样的其它传统的道德观念是不一致的。
Political Perfectionism: Ancient and Modern
Joseph Chan
Department of Politics and Public Administration
The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
In this paper, I discuss the similarities and differences between ancient and modern theories of political perfectionism. I'll focus on Aristotle's and classical Confucian theories to illustrate the ancient theories. I argue that while the ancient theories may be vulnerable to modern liberal critiques of perfectionism, modern theories of perfectionism may not. But there are insights in the ancient theories that can, and ought to be, preserved and developed in a modern theory. I describe the outline of what I believe to be a defensible modern theory.
政治至善论：古典的和现代的
约瑟夫·陈
香港大学社会与公共管理系
在本文里，我讨论了古典的政治至善论和现代的政治至善论的异同。在古典政治至善论部分，我强调了亚里士多德的理论和古典的儒家理论。我认为：虽然古典政治至善论在现代自由主义的批判面前显得脆弱，其现代理论则未必如此。然而在古典理论中有一些洞见能够也应该被现代政治至善论所继承和发展。我描述了一种现代政治至善论的轮廓，而这种理论我认为是能够得到辩护的。
Freedom and Equality in Modern Western Political Philosophy
Chen Wentong
Department of Philosophy, Anhui University, Anqing, China
1. The main focus of political philosophy is to study values and their theoretical basis of one society’s political life from the angle of philosophy. General concepts include freedom, equality, democracy and rule of law, etc. Among them, freedom, equality and their relationship have become hot issues in the research of modern western political philosophy.
2. John Locke first gave a detailed demonstration of value of freedom in modern history and therefore is considered Father of western traditional liberalism. Locke argued that freedom was a concept of human rights and individual freedom was the basis of the relation between freedom and order although freedom could not break out from order. J. J. Rousseau thought freedom and equality were both essential human rights, but others’ equality would be in danger with uncontrolled freedom. Consequently, Rousseau held that equality should enjoy priority to freedom. This idea destroyed traditional concept that freedom and equality should be given the same priority, and this idea has a deep influence on later political science.
3. In the 20th century, this issue is still under critical arguments. J. Deway presented that the freedom one actually enjoyed depended on the equality one enjoyed in political and economical life. Accordingly, he was inclined to build a harmonious order between freedom and equality. F. A. Von Hayek argued that freedom should be higher than equality and the relation between equality and individual liberty could not be in harmony. J. Rawls on the contrary thought there was no conflict between individual liberty and fair distribution of wealth, therefore in the justice of distribution freedom and equality was conformable.
近现代西方政治哲学中的自由和平等
陈闻桐
安徽大学哲学系
一，政治哲学主要是从哲学上研究社会政治生活的价值规范及其理论基础。常见的政治价值范畴有自由、平等、民主、权力、权利、法治等，其中自由、平等等及其关系是近现代西方政治哲学探讨的热点之一。
二，在近代，洛克（J. Locke）是详尽阐述自由价值的第一人，奠定了西方传统自由主义的基础。他提出自由是一个人权概念，即自由是人的基本权利，自由虽不能脱离秩序，但个人自由是自由与秩序关系的基础。卢梭（J. J. Rousseau）认为自由与平等虽同为基本人权，但入对自由不加限制，必定侵犯人的平等权利。据此他提出，自由从属于平等，平等优于自由。这一思想突破了自由与平等等值的传统观念，对后世影响深远。
三，进入20世纪，自由与平等何者优先问题再次受到关注。杜威（J. Dwey）认为人世纪享受的自由权利依赖他在政治经济上的平等权，因而他主张建立自由与平等的和谐秩序。哈耶克（F. A. von Hayek）主张自由至上，断定提升平等与个人自由不相容。罗尔斯（J. Rawls）认为，个人自由与平等分配财富并不冲突，因而在分配正义上，自由与平等是相容的。
Self-Governance and Political Order: the Role of Citizens
Chen Youhong
Department of Public Administration
Chinese Renmin University, Beijing, China
1.The paradox of centralization and decentralization. China's reform process has been actually a history of decentralization efforts. Though decentralization efforts have injected energy into the society, they also leave the society lost of control. In order to recontrol the society, the government has to initiate re-centralization effort. The cost was so high for the reiteration of two different ways. The dilemma of centralization and decentralization originates from the highly-centralized political order that is inefficient to cope with originates from the highly-centralized political order that is inefficient to cope with the diverse problems of various interests because the rigid system is governed by hierarchical commands without relevant rules to deal with those problems. In order to resolve the problem of centralization system, it is necessary to carry on decentralization efforts that inspire society actively. But the undesirable chaos will occur after centralized decentralization efforts because people in over-centralized system not only lack experiences and abilities to self-govern, but also are encouraged to take opportunistic actions when they have some chances.
2.Self-governance and political order. Lack of self-governance results in unsuccessful decentralization reform. Self-governing institutional arrangements must be developed if China wants to cope Self-governing institutional arrangements must be developed if China wants to cope with the dilemma of centralization and decentralization. Successful decentralization reform and institutional transformation depend on the development of various self-governing organizations that could implement self-reform to fit with social changes. The political order based on self-governance can encourage people's creativity to initiate various institutional innovations to self-govern specific public affairs so that individual not only has his right of diverse choices but takes on his responsibility for his choice. To foster self-governing institutions is a proper way to cope with the dilemma of centralization and decentralization.
3. How to develop self-governance in a centralized society. How to develop self-governance in a centralized society? According to the logic of collective action, it would be possible to have an order of spontaneous generation among people of small groups, but it couldn't occur in large groups because free-riding problems would be very serious. So self-governance should be developed from basic community first. Successful decentralization effort should be initiated at grass root level. The success of grass root self-governance is the basic condition of successful decentralization reform efforts in the society with a strong over-centralized tradition.
4.The role of citizens in self-governing political order. Citizens play an important role in a self-governing political order since any institutional innovation must come from individual's doing for benefit-seeking. Citizens play an important role in a self-governing political order since any institutional innovation must come from individual's doing for benefit-seeking. When people are not only concerned with their own benefits but also do the same for the rules of benefit-seeking among the people, individuals start to have an attribute of citizen. And when the virtues that come from personal self-interest possess the public character, it would be possible to construct political order of self-governance. Therefore, it is well reasonable to expect citizens to initiate primary rule for civilian organizations of grass roots and interest groups. And that is considered to be the real opportunities of citizen in political activities. Furthermore, on a basis of daily human life, and as the model of elementary constructions of society, to govern human relation, primary rule develop the various mechanisms to deal with conflicts, and foster positive mutually-productive human mechanisms to deal with conflicts, and foster positive mutually-productive human relationships. So, being so called "social infrastructure" or "social capital", it has the power to countervail "the realpolitik capital of bureaucracy", and it is a main force to make a breakthrough in a rigid centralized system. However, though the virtues that occur due to individual self-interest possess public character, it doesn't mean that could be consequentially to construct political order of self-governance. But citizens' consciousnesses of their rights and responsibilities have been evolved. Therefore, they would set foot in such actions as protecting property right, solving conflicts, coming to agreements, and they would finally appeal to participate to construct the frameworks of rules and institutions of higher levels, and then citizens would give crucial impetus to democratic development. Undoubtedly, not individual citizen but civil society has such power, so it is needed to probe into the course of fostering civil society. In China, civil society must be established in the background of civilian society of traditional institutions and culture, and on a theoretical basis of democratic and constitutional government.
5 To explore a new political theory based on self-governance. A new political order needs a new political theory that is based on self-governance of citizens. Human nature determines that no system could take effect and well continue if without associating with individual benefits, rights, and responsibilities.
A new political theory needs (1) to study how to develop a new political theory based on an analysis of individual citizen. It needs to clarify the relationship between individual and community, and to endow individual with an independent moral status;
(2) to study a new political theory of political order based on self-governance, which make the most use of intellectual resources and practical experiences of human civilization.
自主治理与政治秩序――公民的角色
陈幽泓
中国人民大学行政管理系
一、集权与分权的悖论。中国的改革过程，实际上就是下放权力的过程。权力下放，激发了整个社会的活力，但是也出现了各种各样的混乱的问题。为了解决这些问题，不得不求助于重新集权。而重新集权又面临着新的集权问题。人们不得不在两者之间徘徊，付出了许多不必要的代价。这一悖论的根源在于集权的政治秩序。集权的政治秩序，是一种僵化的、缺乏规则的等级命令秩序体系，在处理物质环境和社会生活都呈多样性的人们的复杂利益结构时力不从心。要解决集权僵化的问题，就需要分权，但是一旦分权，虽然能够激活社会，但由于人们在自主治理方面缺乏经验，缺乏能力，却有集权制度下长期积累的投机能力，就产生了集权体制下一分权就乱的弊病。 二、自主治理与政治秩序。缺乏自主治理，是集权社会难以成功实施分权改革的制度原因。要成功地实现分权改革，摆脱集权与分权悖论，需要培养自主治理的制度安排，允许多类型的自治组织的发展，鼓励实施自主改革以适应变化，从而顺利实施制度变迁。自主治理的政治秩序鼓励人们在公共事务治理中创造各种各样的制度安排以使个人不仅有多样化选择的权利，而且承担其选择的责任，以互利的原则解决冲突以保障多样化的利益格局，从而使个人利益在互动关系格局中成为保障公共利益的动力。培养自主治理的制度，是集权社会摆脱集权与分权两难困境的重要出路。 三、集权社会的自主治理发展。如何在集权社会培养自主治理的制度？集体行动的逻辑表明，在小群体中有自发产生秩序的可能，而在大群体中人的选择倾向于搭便车。因此，自主治理首先要从基层社会开始实施，分权改可能，而在大群体中人的选择倾向于搭便车。因此，自主治理首先要从基层社会开始实施，分权改革首先提条件。在以自主治理为基础的政治秩序中，公民的角色非常重要。因为真正的制度创新均需发端于个人的利益诉求，当个人不仅关心私利，而且关心人们之间的利益关系秩序时，个人也就发生了向公民的转化。当个人私利的诉求所产生的美德开始具有了公共性格时，才有可能产生自主治理基础上的良好政治秩序。因此，公民在政治生活中的位置与作用首先是在基层组织和利益群体内构造初级秩序，其意义在于，这是在基础结构层次上的秩序，它是基于日常生活的人类互动关系模式，它能促进，其意义在于，这是在基础结构层次上的秩序，它是基于日常生活的人类互动关系模式，它能促进发展解决利益冲突的机制，激励利益的互利共存的良性互动。它是人类社会�"社会基础设?会资本）"，它是在社会的发展中对抗"官僚权力资本"、打破集权僵化体制的主要力量。尽由自私性引发出来的德性――公共性格"的演化过程会使公民的责任权利意识在捍卫产权、解决?冲突、建立契约关系的层次领域方面逐渐成长，进而寻求更高层次的规则和制度框架的建设。
四、公民在自主治理的政治秩序中的角色，成为民主的直接推动力量。但是，并不意味着必然会通向建立自主治理的政治秩序。公民作为个人的力量仍不足以抵制、限制和打破集权政府体制。对此需要探讨公民社会发育的进程。近年来中国政治发展中推行的基层自治应立足于民间社会的传统制度和传统文化的土壤，汲取民主、宪政思想理论基础，为公民社会的形成提供动力。
五、发展一种以自主治理为基础的政治理论。新的政治秩序需要一种新的政治理论，以公民自主治理为基础的政治秩序理论。人的本性决定任何秩序如果不与个人的利益与责任权利紧密相关，就不可能发生实际效用和长治久安。
本文的着眼点是：发展以公民个人为分析基点的政治理论，对于中国传统思想而言，需要厘清作为公民的个人与社会、国家的关系，赋予公民自主道德地位；研究社会秩序构造的规则与制度方面的思想成果，促进多样化的人类社会秩序和组织发展类型与对策选择，这需要研究民主立宪的思想如何与民间社会制度和传统文化相契合，促进中国公民社会的成长。
Some Critical Reflections on the Concept of ‘the People’ in Political Discourse
Yung-hsiang Chien
Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy
Academia Sinica, Taiwan
The concept of the people is one of the most frequently used, but least examined, concept in political discourse. Given its importance in the articulation of democracy, the neglect is surprising. I want to provide a general characterization of ‘the people’ in the western political traditions. Then I will try to show, following the lead of James Tully and Habermas, that in keeping with the variety of traditions in political thinking there are diverse understandings of the term. A critical examination of some of these understandings shows, finally, that we need to take the Habermasian proceduralist notion of the people seriously if we want to honor the promise of democracy in a ‘disenchanted’ and pluralist age.
关于“人民”概念的一些哲学反思
钱永祥
台湾中央研究院孙中山社会科学和哲学研究所
“人民”这个概念在政治脉络里时常使用，却也最少有人对它做正面的思考检讨。有鉴于它在民主理论里的根本地位，这种疏忽尤其令人意外。我将先对人民这个概念在西方政治思想里的地位略做描述。然后，跟着James Tully与Habermas的启发，我将列出几种政治传统关于“人民”的不同理解。最后，我想指出，如果民主在这个“除魅”而多元的时代还要有其意义，我们应该正视Habermas有关人民的“程序”式理解。
Freedom as a Subjective Condition of Justice
Jiwei Ci
Department of Philosophy
University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Members of a society become just persons largely through identification with their society's conception of justice. I will bracket the normative question of what conditions such a conception has to satisfy in order to properly count as a conception of justice. My focus is on the moral-psychological (or explanatory) question of what conditions have to obtain if members of a society are to effectively identify with what in their society counts as a conception of justice. Chief among such conditions, I will argue, is that they must be able to relate to their society's conception of justice on the understanding that they have freely decided to adopt this conception as their own. For this to happen, it is not sufficient that they enjoy a certain degree of de facto freedom; it is even more important that they understand their relationship to their society's conception of justice through the concept or interpretation of freedom. But the concept of freedom as used in this context is by no means unproblematic. Liberal thinkers sometimes take such freedom at face value and equate freedom with autonomy, whereas Marxists such as Louis Althusser point out the illusory character of such freedom and treat freedom as nothing more than misrecognition of unforced external determination as self-determination. Two questions arise: (1) under what conditions such misrecognition is possible, or how the concept of freedom and the fact of external determination can combine to produce a more or less conformist individual consciousness that nevertheless understands itself as the agent of its values, including its conception of justice; (2) whether such misrecognition is an unavoidable feature of the exercise of freedom. I will attempt to answer these questions and relate the answers to justice.
自由：作为正义的主观条件
慈纪伟
香港大学哲学系
一个社会的成员主要通过对该社会的正义观的认同和支持而成为公正的个体。我将不考虑这样一个规范性问题：一个概念之所以能被称为正义必需满足什么样的条件。我关注的是这样一个道德-心理学问题（或解释性的问题）：社会成员有效地认同和支持该社会的正义观是以什么为条件的？我的观点是：在这些条件中，主要的是，社会成员接受社会的正义观必须是基于自由的抉择。而为了使社会成员自由地接受社会的正义观，仅仅使他们事实上享有某种程度的自由是不够的，更重要的是，社会成员要通过自由这种观念或体现来理解自身同社会正义观的关系。然而本文中使用的自由概念并非没有问题的。自由主义思想家有时仅仅根据该词的字面涵义，将自由等同于自主；与此同时，象路易斯·阿尔图塞（Louis Althusser）等马克思主义者则指出这种自由概念的虚幻性质，而认为自由实际上仅仅是将非强制性的外在规定误解为自我决定。这儿便出现了两个问题：（1）这种误解在什么条件下是可能的，或者说，自由概念和非强制习惯内的外在规定这种事实是如何结合在一起以产生一种或多或少倾向于遵循规范的个体意识，而这种意识将自身看作社会价值及其正义观念的源泉？（2）是否这种误解是自由实践的一个无可避免的特性？我将试图回答这两个问题并将之与正义观念联系起来。
Culture, Sovereignty and Human Rights
Michael Freeman
Department of Government, University of Essex, UK
In this paper I seek to advance our thinking about two of the most commonly discussed philosophical problems raised by the idea of human rights. The first is how the idea should be related to that of state sovereignty. The second is that of the relation between the supposed universality of human rights and the diverse cultural traditions of the world. Although much has been written about both these problems, the relation between the two problems has been largely ignored. I shall argue that clarification of this last relation is an important philosophical task. I shall argue, in support of this general conclusion, that objections to the universal applicability of human-rights standards on the ground of state sovereignty are often confused with objections on the ground of cultural diversity. I shall argue that these two objections not only have quite different logic, but also that they are mutually inconsistent, for the principle of state sovereignty is as universalist as that of human rights, and either both principles are vulnerable to objections on the ground of cultural diversity or neither are.
The next step in the argument is to clarify what is valuable in the idea of state sovereignty and what is valuable in the idea of human rights in order to reach a reasonable view of how the two ideas should be interrelated. In this section I shall argue that critics of both ideas have often failed to understand adequately the values that the ideas are intended to defend. If this is clearly analyzed, the ground may be laid for reconciling the two ideas in a way that preserves what is valuable in each.
Then a similar analysis is made of culture and human rights. Particular attention will be paid to two view of the relation between culture and human rights that have been proposed recently by philosophers. The first begins with the presumption of the universality of human rights and then seeks to incorporate into that view what is valuable in the diverse cultures of the world. The second treats culture as fundamental and investigates how human rights may be incorporated into particular cultural perspectives. These two approaches are illustrated with particular reference to Confucianism and Islam. I argue that reflection on these two approaches raises the most fundamental questions about the grounds of ethical and political thought. However, even some of the best philosophical thinking on this subject has confused philosophical with strategic political questions. This confusion is tempting insofar as philosophers are concerned with practical policies as well as pure philosophical analysis. However, a strictly philosophical analysis can clarify policy options, although it is doubtful whether it can endorse a particular solution as absolutely the best.
In conclusion, I offer an answer to the question as to whether philosophical analysis can offer solutions to questions about culture, sovereignty and human rights that could be accepted by reasonable persons in different cultural and ideological traditions, and in societies at different levels of development and placed differently in the global political system. I suggest that there are philosophical reasons for believing that there are always likely to be tensions among these principles, but that philosophy can clarify the relevant issues, advance agreement to some extent, and thereby contribute to the management within tolerable limits of practical political disputes.
文化、主权和人权
迈克尔·弗里曼
英国艾塞克斯大学政府系
在本文中我将进一步思考由于人权思想导致的两个最受关注的哲学问题。第一个问题是人权思想如何与国家主权思想相联的。第二个是所谓的人权的普世性与世界上不同的文化传统之间的关系问题。虽然在这两个问题上已经有许多论述，但这两个问题的关系却在很大程度上被忽略了。我想表明的是，澄清这种关系是一个重要的哲学任务。为了支持这种一般观点，我将证明：站在国家主权立场上反对人权标准的普世适用的意见常常与出于文化多样性立场的反对意见混淆在一起。我认为这两种反对意见不仅有完全不同的逻辑，而且他们之间也彼此不一致，因为国家主权原则同人权原则一样是普遍的，面对着文化多样性立场上的反对意见，这两个原则要么同样脆弱，要么都可免于攻击。 在接下来的论述中我将澄清在国家主权观念和人权观念中有价值的思想，以合理地说明两者是如何紧密相联的。在这一部分我会证明这两者的批评者经常没有恰当地理解他们所批评的观念所试图捍卫的价值。如果这一点能够得到很清晰的分析，就能够为调和这两个观念奠定基础并保留两者中各自有价值的成分。 然后对文化和人权会进行类似的分析。最近哲学家们提出的关于文化与人权关系上的两种观点将会受到特别的关注。第一种观点预定了人权的普世性，进而将在各种文化中有价值的成分纳入这种普世性中；第二种观点认为文化是根本的，并试图将人权包含在特殊文化的视角中。特别是在关涉到儒家思想和伊斯兰教时这两种方式得到阐释。我会表明，对这两种方式的反思将对伦理和政治思想的基础提出最基本的问题。然而，就是在这方面的一些最出色的哲学思想也把哲学问题与策略性的政治问题混淆在一起了。只要哲学家像关心纯粹哲学分析一样关心实践政策，这种混淆的危险就会存在。当然，严格的哲学分析是能够澄清政策选择的，不过在它能否确证特定方案的最优性上则是值得怀疑的。 最后，我会为下述问题给出一种答案：关于文化、主权和人权问题上，哲学分析能否为在全球政治系统中处于不同发展阶段和不同地位的社会中具有不同文化和意识形态传统的理性人提供都可接受的解决方法？我将表明，从哲学上讲，有理由相信，这些原则间可能会总是存在张力，但哲学能澄清有关的因素并在某种程度上达成一致，从而有助于在可容忍限度内管理和控制实际政治争端。
Constitutional Justice and Transcendental Justice
--------Two Kinds of Justices and their Paradox
Gao Quanxi
The Graduate School, Chinese Academy of Social Sciecnes
The article focuses on the the two kinds of justices, constitutional Justice and Transcendental Justice and their tensile relation, suggesting that the negative value of constitutional justice, as the social institutional justice, takes on the legal protection of human right, especially of the low-lined human right. The constitutionalism is based on a public sphere with negative law as rule, so that it transforms the allocation of the modern political value logically, i.e. traditionally ,only the reasonable value is legitimate, whereas in the constitutionalism, only the legitimate value is reasonable. In other words, it has changed the standard of value from the former positive logic, based on the moralization of human nature, to the negative one, based on the legalization of human nature. Rawls and Hayek demonstrate this logic conversion from different ways separately. Although constitutionalism could resist all the powerful political logic, it appeals for another transcendental value fundamentally. The article analyses the spiritual law, which has been very important in the history of western political thoughts, and points that the justice of law is human right, and the justice of god is holy love. Conclusively, the article suggests, we could find not only the paradox and the conflict of the two justices, but also their uniform linkage to guard against the political power. This paradox linkage full of tension will bring a dual foundation to the social politics in the future.
宪政正义与超验正义——两种正义及其悖论
高全喜
中国社会科学院研究生院
本文着重考察了宪政正义与超验正义两种正义及其张力性关系。指出宪政正义作为社会性的制度正义，它的否定性价值呈现出对于人权，尤其是底限人权的合法性保障的意义。由于宪政的法律制度预设的乃是一个否定性的以法律为尺规的公共领域，因此就把近现代有关政治价值的定位从逻辑上进行了一番改造，即传统政治价值形态那里所表述的是，只有合理的价值才是合法的，而宪政的法律制度则反过来表述为，只有合法的价值才是合理的，或者说，它把价值标准从过去那种以人的本性的道义化为基础的肯定性逻辑，转变为以人的本性的合法性为基础的否定性逻辑。罗尔斯和哈耶克这两个不同类型的自由主义思想家分别从不同的进路展现了这种逻辑的转换。宪政正义虽然可以抗拒各种强势的政治逻辑，但从根基上需要吁请另外一种超验的价值，本文通过对在西方政治思想史占据突出地位的神法的分析，指出法律的正义是人权，上帝的正义是圣爱。文章最后认为，我们可能从两种正义中不仅看到了它们的悖论，以及相互间的对立与冲突，而且还将看到它们在抵御政治强权方面的一致性关联，正是这种充满张力的悖论式关联将为人类未来的社会政治提供一种双重的正义根基。
On Ideas of Liberty in Rawls’ Theory of Justice
Gong Qun
Department of Philosophy, Renmin University of China
The Conception of liberty plays a very important role in Rawls’ political philosophy, as we know, it is the cornerstone of Rawls’ theory. The conception of liberty is political one by Rawls, and we can get the idea of liberty by negative way because Rawls defines it from such way that he says “this or that person (persons) is free (or not free) from this or that constraint (or set of constraints) to do (or not to do) so and so”. The idea of liberty in Rawls’ political philosophy inherited the liberalist tradition of Constant and Isaiah Berlin. Meanwhile, Rawls emphasizes one kind of positive meaning. He says: “thus persons are at liberty to do something when they are free from certain constrains either to do it or not to do it ”. Liberty is our action which we can do by my will and perform the decision made by ourselves and it is protected from interference by other persons, and from this meaning, liberty is individual rights which include all kind of human rights, such as the right of life, of speech, of political election, of property and so on, and which are equal and natural rights for all persons of mankind. Therefore, the subject of liberty becomes one of equal rights. Rawls argues that, first of all, equal Liberty of conscience is predominant important one, second is political election. I think that there is no question about them. However, Rawls meets problems when he deals with the right of property. Equal rights of property develop in two directions in 200 –300 years. One is that equally right of property in theory gets its legitimate status, and permits unequal possession in legality. Another is that there seeks for equality of real possession in social life. The direction origins from Jacques Rousseau, through Karl Marx and passes on communist movement. However, social practice proves that it is unsuccessful. The choice by Rawls is neither John Locke’s one and nor Jacques Rousseau’s one, which on the essential presupposition that economic inequality that gives the greatest benefit of the last advantaged, second distribution by state is necessary. However, the second distribution must interfere in individual rights of property. Therefore, the tendency of equality in Rawls’ new liberalism can not extricate oneself from a predicament of freedom and equality, both have a kind of inter-contradiction.
论罗尔斯的自由理念
龚 群
中国人民大学
“自由”这一概念在罗尔斯的政治哲学中占有一个突出重要的地位，它是罗尔斯的理论基石。罗尔斯的“自由”概念是一个政治概念，它的意义首先是从消极意义上给出的，即它是免以强制而能自由地做什么。罗尔斯的这一概念定义反映了它对贡斯当和伯林等自由主义传统的思想继承。同时，罗尔斯的自由概念强调了不受强制前提下的自我作主的行动，在这个意义上，自由就是一种权利。这种自由权利，包括生命权、思想权、言论权、政治参与权以及财产权，从契约论的观点看，它是一种平等的天赋权。在这个意义上，自由问题也就演变为平等权利的问题。罗尔斯认为，它首先是体现消极自由的良心自由权的问题，其次是体现在政治权利的平等上。如人人都有平等的选举权、受教育权等。然而，在财产权方面，罗尔斯则持有一种新的态度。近代以来，平等权问题朝两个方向发展，一是承认理念上的财产权为人人平等享有，但却允许存在经济上的不平等。这个方向为洛克所开创，二是追求实际财产占有上的平等。这个方面为卢梭所开创，其间经过马克思，为共产主义运动所追求。但苏联东欧解体以及中国的经济体制改革证明，以取消私有财产权为制度基础的计划体制，在现代物质生产条件下没有生命力。一百多年的社会实践证明，这种追求并不成功。但是，罗尔斯的新自由主义既不是洛克式传统的自由主义，同时也不是卢梭式平等主义，而是在承认经济不平等能够给最少受惠者带来最大利益的前提下，强调国家对于最少受惠者给予补偿的原则。然而，这种再分配必然侵犯到个人持有的自由权利。罗尔斯的平等主义倾向摆脱不了这种自由与平等的内在困境。
First Steps in an Account of Human Rights
James Griffin
Centre for Philosophy and Public Affairs, Department of Moral Philosophy
University of St Andrews, Scotland
1. The very idea of human rights
2. Different approaches to explaining rights
3. The rights tradition
4. A proposal of a substantive account
5. One ground for human rights: personhood
6. A second ground: practicalities
7. Is there a third ground?: equality
8. How we should understand ‘agency’
9. A desirable consequence: the narrowing of rights
10. Utilitarianism?
人权的基本问题
詹姆士·格利芬
苏格兰圣安德鲁大学道德哲学系哲学与公共事务中心
1、 人权概念一般
2、 解释权利的不同方式
3、 权利的传统
4、 关于实质性论述的一种建议
5、 人权的基础之一：人格
6、 人权的基础之二：务实或实践性
7、 第三个基础：平等？
8、 我们该如何理解“代表制”
9、 一种想望的后果：对权利的限定
10、功利主义？
On Fundamental Principles and Factors of the Rule of Law
Gu Su
Department of Philosophy
Nanjing University, Nanjing, China
Although the rule of law is not an unified model, and historical conditions and cultural traditions of various countries are quite different, its basic principles and institutions are generally consistent, i.e. law is superior to administrative power, the constitution has the highest authority, and person or group should not outmatch the law; democratic legislation requires that the legislative body should be born of universal and periodic elections and its main tasks include setting up laws and supervising the administration; judicial branch is independent and has high position and authority, also practises judicial review to prevent arbitrary violation of the constitution; check and balance institutions among different branches of the government to prevent that a single branch has too much or monopolistic power.
论法治的基本特征和要素
顾 肃
南京大学哲学系
现代法治虽无划一的模式，各国历史条件和文化传统也存在诸多差别，但所采取的基本原则和制度大体一致，主要是法律大于行政权力，宪法具有至高无上的权威，任何人和团体不得凌驾于法律之上；立法民主，由拥有广泛代表性和定期选举阐述的立法机构制定法律、监督行政；司法独立、拥有崇高地位和权威，并且实行防止随意违宪的司法审查制度；政府各权力机构间实行牵制与平衡，以防止单个机构权力过大。
On Historicity and Ideality of Human Rights with Comments on A. J. M. Milne’s Philosophy of Human Rights
Han Zhen
Department of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China
In fact, rights have been the historical production instead of the permanent entity a priori. The rights in the Western society, which have rooted in the Western social and cultural system, are reflecting the social ideas and views of value in the Western society. The Western ideas of human rights can only be applied to Western society. As Karl Marx points out, rights can never go beyond the economic structure of the society and the cultural development of the society that has been limited by the economic structure. Even the starting and ending of life has been a controversial issue among scholars. On the issues such as abortion and euthanasia there are different ideas. We think that A. J. M. Milne misunderstood the relations between real foundation of human rights and ideal function of human rights in his dividing the standards of human rights into ideal and the lowest. Since, from the aspect of historical development, any standard of human rights is both lowest and ideal. How can we say that the standard of Western human rights is ideal and that the standard in the third world is non-ideal? The scope of the human rights will be widened, the contents of human rights will be enriched as the progress of the society. Although the basic rights are still facing various threats by now, we cannot ignore the fact that the human rights have got more protections.
论人权的历史性和理想性—兼评米尔恩的《人权哲学》
韩 震
北京师范大学哲学系
实际上，权利并不是一种先验的永恒本质，它们是历史的产物。西方世界所说的权利反映的是西方社会的社会理念和价值观，植根于西方社会的历史和文化系统中。西方人权观只能适用于西方社会，正像马克思分析的那样，“权利永远不能超出社会的经济结构以及由经济结构所制约的社会的文化发展。”即使在生命的起点和终点上，人们的意见也很难统一。对流产和安乐死等问题，人们有着极其矛盾的观点。我们认为，A.J.M米尔恩把人权标准分为理想的和最低的，错误地理解了人权的现实基础与理想功能之间的关系。因为，从历史发展的角度看，任何人权标准都是最低的，也是理想的。怎能说西方的权利标准是理想的，而第三世界的标准就无理想性？随着社会的进步，个人权利的范围会越来越广，权利的内容也会增加。尽管直到目前为止，人的基本权利仍旧受到各种各样的威胁，但人的权利变得越来越有保障也是不容否认的事实。
Criticism from Within and Without: Wittgensteinian Reflections
Cressida Heyes
Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, Canada
What are the limits of criticising culturally and politically different others? Some analysts say abuses of power within a society are best criticised from without, and claim this prerogative. Defenders of the practices in question say that only from within a domestic context can the practices be understood, and their legitimacy appreciated. Are the foreign critics mistakenly assuming the commensurability of worldviews—some alcultural standpoint from which to assess the justice or legitimacy of human practices? Are the defenders being overly relativistic? Does relativism obviate critique altogether?
Renewed interest in these debates among political philosophers has emerged from a literature that stresses the constructedness of political meaning. For example, Wittgenstein famously argued that following a rule is not a private, individual matter. What it means to follow a rule correctly is rather a social practice; taken together, such practices are constitutive of a "form of life." Political theorists such as Charles Taylor, Susan Hekman, and Richard Shusterman have taken up this model, showing how it might illuminate problems of contemporary democracy. This work raises two particularly pressing further questions: first, how should we theorise the coexistence and mutual (un)intelligibility of the plurality of forms of life in, for example, multicultural political societies? Second, how, given the epistemic necessity of working from within the practices that make up a form of life, can new practices be imagined and gain currency?
In this paper I argue briefly that a Wittgensteinian model provides an answer to the first question through the notion of family resemblances. No political concept has a single monolithic meaning within a form of life; rather, it consists of a series of interrelated and politically contested meanings. For example, what counts as "democracy" for some will be the simple matter of the existence of an institution for electing representatives to a legislature. For others, however, "democracy" carries much more weighty connotations of citizen equality and political participation. Clearly these are related concepts, making it possible for their respective proponents to be mutually intelligible. However, they are also sufficiently distant to make debate around this essentially contested concept more than a matter of simple clarification.
The answer to the first question also provides guidance in answering the second, a particularly pressing one in theorising political conversation among radically different nation states. Some critics have taken the intractability of this problem to provide an implicit defence of relativism (and even conservatism): if existing social practices are the only basis intractability of this problem to provide an implicit defence of relativism (and even conservatism): if existing social practices are the only basis for social criticism, then the scope of that criticism will be necessarily constrained by the very form of life it seeks to alter. Consequently, intercultural communication cannot rely on any acontextual criteria of rationality (such as a Habermasian ideal speech situation) and political concepts become at best approximate translations across difference, and at worst incommensurable.
This position, however, assumes a uniformity to forms of life that the family resemblance approach to political concepts shows to be misguided. Both within and among forms of life, controversial political views are intelligible because they tap into marginal practices not closely related to those in the mainstream. An important consequence of this argument is that central to effective political dissent is the process of building communities of meaning. There is a tradition in the west of viewing political dissent as made possible simply by the right to free speech, and writers since Mill have tended to stress the individual as the locus of political resistance. Instead, I argue, we should see conditions that foster resistant communities as most central. Thus, finally, I suggest that this approach can evade the false dichotomy between universalism and relativism in the contexts I pointed towards initially.
内部批评和外部批评：维特根斯坦主义的思考
克雷西达·海耶斯
加拿大阿尔贝塔大学哲学系
对文化和政治上持不同意见者的批判的限度是什么？一些分析家认为最好是从外部批评一个社会内对权力的滥用，并称之为特权。而该习俗（特权）的辩护者则认为，只有从内部处境出发，这些习俗才能得到理解，其合法性才能得到较高评价。是否外部批评者错误地假定了世界观的可通约性——一种估价人类习俗的正当性或合法性的超文化的视域？或者那些习俗的辩护者全然是相对主义的？是否相对主义完全排除了批判呢？ 由于强调政治意义的构造性的文本的出现，在政治哲学家中对上述争论的问题又出现了新的兴趣。举例来说，维特根斯坦曾非常有名地论证说：对规则的遵循不是一个私人的、个体的事件。恰当地说，对规则的遵循是一种社会惯例；这些社会惯例共同构成“生活形式”。象查理士·泰勒（Charles Tayler）、苏珊·赫克曼（Susan Hekman）、理查德·舒茨曼（Richard Shusterman）等政治理论家继承了这种模式，以之来解释当代民主政治的问题。这种努力进一步提出了两个紧迫的问题：首先，我们该如何解释在多文化的政治社会中多元的生活形式之间的共存和相互可理解性（或不可理解性）问题？其次，假定构成生活形式的惯例从认识论上是必要的，那么新的惯例是如何被设想并获得普遍承认的？
在本文中，我会简要地证明，通过家族相似的观念，维特根斯坦主义的模式为第一个问题提供了一种答案。在某种生活形式内，没有一个政治概念具有单一的、固定不变的意义；相反，它包含一个相互关联、在政治上彼此争议的意义系列。举一个例子，对有的人来说，民主政体就是这样一个简单的事实：立法机构的代表的选举这样一种机制的存在。而对另一些人来说，民主政体还包含着更重要的内涵：公民的平等和公民的政治参与。明显地，这是一些相互关联的观念，从而各自的支持者彼此间的相互理解是可能的。然而，这些观念也彼此保持了足够的距离，使得围绕这个本质上有争议的概念产生种种争论，而不仅仅是对概念的澄清。 第一个问题的答案也为回答第二个问题提供了指导，而后一个问题对于解释极为不同的民族国家之间的政治对话显得尤为紧迫。一些批评家利用这个难以处理的问题为相对主义（甚至是保守主义）作出含蓄的辩护：如果现存的社会惯例是社会批判的唯一基础，那么这种批判的范围就必然被它试图改变的生活形式所限定。因而，文化间的对话不能依赖任何跨文化的理性标准（就如哈贝马斯的话语处境概念），而在不同文化间的政治概念至多只是一种近似的翻译，甚至是不可互译的。 然而，这种立场假定了生活形式本身的齐一性，而政治概念的家族相似的方法将表明这一点是容易误导的。无论是在生活形式内部还是在生活形式之间，相互争议的政治论点之间是可理解的，因为这些论点都涉及到与主流惯例关系松散的边缘惯例。这一论证的一个重要的结果就是：意义共同体的构成过程对于实际的政治异议是至关重要的。西方的一种传统认为仅仅是由于言论自由的权利政治异议才变得可能的，从穆勒之后的著述家倾向于强调将个体作为政治抵制的场所。而我所要论证的是：我们应当将促成抵制团体的条件看作最重要的因素。最后我会表明，这种方法能够避免本文开头我所论及的那种在普世主义和相对主义之间的错误的二分法。
Philosophical Justifications of Human Rights
Jens Hinkmann
Institute for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
University of Erfurt, Germany
The debate on human rights is extremely confusing and dazzling. Mixing political, philosophical, juridicial and many other aspects stemming from a broad variety of academic disciplines the participants of the discourse are often discussing different topics with diverging methodologies. Clarification is necessary and should be the first step. Therefore, a strictly philosophical analysis (within the analytic philosophy of law) should provide a common framework or set-up for the discussion. Using ideas from Hohfeld, Thomson and some own suggestions a net of terms with precise meanings for the debate on human rights is developed and applied on the three generations of human rights.
The second step is the discussion whether there is a normative justification for human rights as universal norms. This means that they should be justified as valid claims independent of cultural or historical conditions having corresponding obligations for political communities. This debate is at the heart of every theory of political justice. By showing the illegitimacy of natural law on the one hand and some communitarian approaches on the other hand, I attempt to develop a theory justifying human rights. It is based on the idea of normative individualism and justified by means of an analysis of the rule of law concerning the individual members of a society or a state. To challenge these ideas, I then introduce the concept of descriptive holism aiming at an explanation of the difficulties typically arising in the normative and political discourse on human rights. With the simple analytic but basic matrix of normativism versus descriptivism and individualism versus holism this theory is enriching and pushing forward ideas and concepts of H?ffe, Gert, Gewirth and Rawls.
A final application on the complex of human rights and human development discussing the possible interdependence of political and economic issues within the philosophical framework (!) will argue for a reasonable link between the political and the economic sphere of human rights to enable lasting progress in both areas.
人权的哲学辩护
延斯·欣克曼
德国艾尔福特大学法哲学和社会哲学研究所
在人权方面的辩论是极其难以理解而又令人眼花缭乱的。由于混合了政治学的、哲学的、法学的以及其它来自范围广泛的学科的诸多领域，这些论述的参与者们常常是在用不同的方法论讨论不同的主题。因此，对问题的澄清是必要的，也应当是首要的。一种严格的哲学分析（在分析的法哲学范围内）应当为讨论提供一个共同的框架。通过霍夫菲尔德（Hohfeld）、汤姆森（Thomson）的一些思想和自己的考虑，我为人权上的争论建立了一个有确切定义的术语体系，并将之应用于人权的三个发展阶段。
第二步是讨论人权是否存在一种作为普遍规范的正当性。这意味着人权将证明自己作为一种正当的权利拥有相应的对政治共同体的责任，而这种正当的权利是独立于文化和历史条件的。这一争论将是任何一种政治正义理论的核心。在指出自然法理论和一些社群主义方法的不合理之后，我将提出一种理论来为人权提供正当性依据。它将奠基于规范性的个人主义上；这种论证是通过对关涉到社会或国家的个体成员的法律规则的分析进行的。为了检验这些思想，我将引入一种描述性的整体论概念以解释由于在人权上的规范性的和政治的争论所导致的困难。通过规范主义-描述主义和个人主义-整体论这种简要然而基本的分析结构，该理论将丰富和推进霍夫（Hoffe）、吉尔特（Gert）、格威尔特（Gewirth）和罗尔斯等人的思想。
最后在人权和人类发展的复合体之应用上将在哲学框架内讨论政治和经济因素之间可能的相互依赖，并论证人权的政治领域和经济领域间的一种合理的关联，而这将使得它们各自的持续进步成为可能。
'Citizen' Participation and Global Warming
Barry Holden
Department of Politics, University of Reading, UK
This paper will take as its starting point the question of what opportunities people should have to participate in making political decisions. It wiil, however, be concerned with what can be called 'political decisions' in an extended sense. Normally, political decisions are thought of as decisions about state policy. And such decisions are democratic when, or to the extent that, they are made by the people of the state in question. However, in an era of globalisation and interdependence a state is increasingly unable to control matters that affect the people within its territory. Many such matters, to the extent that they are controllable at all, are subject to decisions taken elsewhere - for example, by other states or by international bodies. In such circumstances the ideas of citizenship and democratic decision making must be re-thought and perhaps only some kind of 'global democracy' can now give real opportunities for people to participate in many of the most important decisions that affect them.
With the work of David Held and others the idea of global democracy is becoming of increasing importance. This paper will explore the relevance this idea might have for the problem of combating global warming. It will argue that, apart from anything else, a form of global democracy would help to overcome global collective action problems and would give necessary legitimacy - and perhaps be a spur - to difficult decisions that would entail short-term material sacrifices. It would also help to
deal with problems of international social justice concerning the relative contributions to be expected by the North and the South to efforts to combat global warming.
公民参与和全球变暖问题
巴里·霍尔敦
英国雷丁大学政治学系
本文将从下述问题开始：人们应当有什么样的机会参与政治决策。然而，此处关注的“政治决策”是在较广泛的意义上理解的。一般而言，政治决策被认为是关于国家政策的决定过程；如果这些决定是由国家的人民作出的，则该政治决策就是民主的。然而，在一个全球化和相互依赖的时代，单个国家越来越无法控制一些对其管辖范围内人民产生影响的问题。在其可控制的范围内，许多问题都必须由其它的单位来决定，如其它的国家集团或国际社会。在这种情况下，公民和民主决策概念必须重新考虑，并且，或许现在只有某种“全球民主制”才能为人民参与一些最重要的决策提供真正的机会，而这些决策是会对他们产生影响的。 由于大卫·希尔德（David Held）和其他人的努力，全球民主制的观念正变得越来越重要。本文将考察这种观念对遏制全球变暖问题的现实意义。本文将证明：除了其它因素之外，某种形式的全球民主制将为全球性集体行动问题找到解决办法，并为之提供必要的合法性，并且它或许将为某些困难决策提供动力，而这些困难决策将会牵涉到牺牲短期的物质利益。全球民主制也会有助于解决国际社会公正的问题，即在遏制全球变暖问题的努力上北方和南方所应该作出的贡献问题。
Why the Aim to Neutralize Luck Cannot Provide a Basis for Egalitarianism
Susan Hurley
University of Warwick, UK
1. Introduction
Cohen (1989): fundamental egalitarian aim is to neutralize influence of luck on distribution. Luck/responsibility cut. Luck-egalitarianism as developed by Cohen, Roemer, Arneson claims to make explicit key assumption implicit in egalitarian theorizing.
My claim: while this assumption may well have been thus implicit, nevertheless the aim to neutralize luck cannot provide a basis for egalitarianism, either in the sense of specification or of justification.
Minimal constraint: to count as egalitarian, a doctrine must, for some X, favor relatively more equal patterns of distribution of X over relatively less equal distributions of X, other things equal.
Preview: Distinguish what is redistributed from how it is redistributed: the currency from the pattern of distributive justice. Cannot derive how from what, or pattern from currency. Luck/responsibility can play currency role, but this does not entail an egalitarian pattern. Indeed, luck/responsibility cannot play patterning role.
2. Currency vs. pattern: the limits of the currency role of responsibility in justice and the egalitarian fallacy.
Currency role: responsibility as filter, yielding equalisandum. We only aim to redistribute what is a matter of luck, not what people are responsible for.
Limits: 1) need independent specification of good to which filter is applied, eg. resources, welfare, both. 2) Knowing what to redistribute does not tell us how to redistribute.
Parfit: equality (concerned with interpersonal relations) vs. priority, eg maximin (concerned with relation between someone’s actual state and other possible states he might have been in). Distinction in space of patterns, not currencies.
Aim to redistribute only what is a matter of luck: does not favor equality over maximin, even if maximin countenances differences that are a matter of luck. Equality may equally countenance samenesses that are a matter of luck. Nonresponsibility for difference does not entail responsibility for nondifference. Responsibility neither specifies nor justifies taking equality as default.
Egalitarian fallacy:
(1) It is a matter of luck that a and b are unequal does not entail
(2) It would not be a matter of luck if a and b were equal
Equality default view: equality does not need to be justified; responsibility can be used to justify departures from equality. Not guilty of egalitarian fallacy. But not a counterexample to my claim. Even if it is conceded that responsibility plays a patterning role here, it does not do so in relation to aspect of the view that is egalitarian: the assumption of equality as a default position. It plays a similar role in the inequality default view, which only permits equalities for which people are responsible and defaults to inequality.
To suggest responsibility play only currency role, no patterning role, is to concede that it does not provide basis for egalitarianism. Consistent with redistributing the currency in favor of inequality.
3. Can responsibility play a patterning role? The luck-neutralizer’s dilemma.
Aim to neutralize bad or good luck provides no reason to favor equality as a pattern of distribution. Bad luck ambiguous, interpersonal vs. counterfactual senses.
The luck neutralizer’s dilemma:
Interpersonal bad luck: my situation is worse than others’, in respect of aspects of my situation for which I am not responsible. Neutralizing interpersonal bad luck specifies an equal pattern of distribution of whatever is a matter of luck. But trivial, since inequality used to identify bad luck. No independent specification; no independent justification for favoring or defaulting to equality, for countenancing equalities that are a matter of luck but not inequalities that are a matter of luck.
Counterfactual bad luck: as a matter of luck I am worse off than I might have been. Suppose it is determinate what I would be responsible for under counterfactual conditions in which factors for which I am not responsible are eliminated, and similarly what you would be responsible for. There’s no reason to suppose these positions would tend to be equal.
It doesn’t help if no one is responsible for anything because responsibility is impossible: if so, equality is no less a matter of luck than inequality.
4. Can responsibility play a patterning role? Problems of interpersonal and counterfactual responsibility.
Specification, if not justification? No: counterfactual horn of dilemma leads to deeper problems: 1) the boring problem with responsibility for relations between people’s positions; 2) the indeterminacy problem about would not be a matter of luck when actual situation is a matter of luck.
1) Distinguish: S’s responsibility for her goods position (e.g. as a result of her choices) vs. S’s responsibility for the relation of her goods position to that of others.
Responsibility does not specify pattern of relations across people. What would it be for a pattern of distribution of goods not to be a matter of luck? Even when 2 people are both responsible for their respective levels of goods, whether unequal or equal, the relation between them is still partly a matter of luck for each of them, since neither is responsible for the other’s position. Point generalizes from actual to counterfactual relations.
2) If people are not responsible for their respective levels of goods: what would they be responsible for instead, if factors for which they are not responsible were eliminated? Luck-neutralizing aim does not tell us to move from one distribution that is a matter of luck to another that is also a matter of luck. Not just that there’s no reason to think we’d all be responsible for the same thing, but that what we’d be responsible for, counterfactually, is in many cases simply indeterminate: no general, nonarbitrary basis for saying what would not be a matter of luck under counterfactual conditions. Not merely an epistemological problem; the very concept of responsibility does not extend determinately this far in many cases.
5. Related issues.
Defects of hypothetical choice accounts of responsibility: causal costlessness, indeterminacy. Cf. actual choice or control.
Aim to neutralize the effects of luck makes operational the regression principle, that responsibility for something requires responsibility for its causes. Under plausible assumptions, this principle makes responsibility impossible. But that would not provide a basis for egalitarianism either.
Roemer’s account of what it would be to neutralize luck does not provide a basis for egalitarianism either. Rather, it shows how we can reward people for efforts to behave in ways we regard as meritorious; this may or may not favor egalitarian patterns, depending on what we regard as meritorious.
为何使机会均等的努力不能为平均主义奠定基础
苏珊·赫尔雷
英国瓦里克大学哲学系
1、引言。
科恩（Cohen）(1989):平均主义的基本宗旨是在分配上均衡机会的影响；机会份额与责任份额；由科恩、罗莫尔（Roemer）、阿勒森（Arneson）发展起来的机会平均主义要求在平均主义的理论中应使原本明确的基本公设不那么直接。
我的观点：公设会因此变得含蓄起来，然而，无论在描述性的意义上还是在规范性的意义上，使机会均等的宗旨仍然不能为平均主义提供基础。
最低的限定：对于某物X的分配，作为平均主义理论，其信条必须倾向于那些更平均的分配模式而不是那些相对较不平均的分配模式，这对于其它事物的分配也适用。
预先评论：应区分再分配的物资和该物资再分配的模式：使物资同分配的公正模式区分开来。不能从“什么”中推导出“如何”，也不能从物资中推导出结构模式。机会与责任可以承担物资的功能，但这并不牵涉到一个平均主义的模式。事实上，机会与责任不能扮演结构模式的角色。
2、物资-结构：在正义中责任的物资功能的限度以及平均主义的谬论。
物资功能：责任作为过滤器要求平等。我们的目标仅仅是分配机会，而不是分配义务。
限度：1）需要对过滤器被应用的物资如资源、福利等进行独立的描述。2）知道分配什么并没有告诉我们应该如何分配。
帕菲特（Parfit）:机会平等（ 关涉到人际间关系）与最优值等优先权（关涉到某人的实际状况和其它可能状况的之间的关系）。结构模式的区分而不是物资的区分。
目标仅仅是再分配机会：纵使最优值支持机会非均等，在最优值和平等中，也不更倾向于机会均等。平等可能同样地支持机会上的等同。对非均等的无责任并不牵涉到对均等的责任。责任既不能描述将平等看作失责这种情况，也不能证明其正当性。
平均主义的谬论：
（1） 平均是一个机会问题，“a和b不是平均的”并不牵涉在内。
（2） 如果a和b是平均的，平均就不是个机会问题。
平均即失责的观点：平均并不需要获得正当性；责任能够被用来论证偏离平均的合法性。平均主义的谬误并非罪过，然而也不能反驳我的论点。纵使容许责任承担结构或模式的功能，这也不是在与平均主义观点相关的意义上如此，因为这儿的公设是：平均即失责。责任在另一种观点中（不平均即失责）扮演类似的角色：在这种观点中，人们对平均负有责任，相反则是失责的。
认为责任只承担物资的功能而非结构的功能，这等于是支持下述观点：责任并不能为平均主义奠定基础。责任是与在分配中倾向于非平均主义的立场一致的。
3、 责任是否能承担结构或模式的功能？机会均等主义者的两难困境。
使好的或坏的机会均等的努力不能为倾向于机会均等的分配模式提供理由。坏的机会在“人际间的”和“逆事实的”之间的含混的含义。
机会均等主义者的两难：
人际的坏机会：就那些我不应当负责的方面，“我的处境比别人的差”。使人际间的坏机会均等也描述了一种机会分配上的平均模式，然而，因为非平均被用来定义坏机会，这是一种不太有价值的模式。对于支持机会平等或谴责机会平等是失责两种情况来说，都不存在本身有效的描述，也不存在本身有效的合法性论证，因为它们仅仅支持作为机会的平均而不支持作为机会的不平均这种情况。
逆事实的坏机会：就机遇而言，我比本来可能的处境糟多了。在逆事实的条件下（那些我不能为之负责的因素被清除了），设想那些我应当为之负责的处境是确定的；同样，你所应当负责的处境也是确定的。没有理由认为这些处境会是倾向于平等的。
认为责任是不可能的，并进而认为没有人应当为任何事情负责，这种观点一点都不解决问题；因为如果是这样，平均将和不平均一样都是个机会问题。
4、责任是否能够承担结构或模式的功能？人际间的责任问题和逆事实的责任问题。
如果不能论证其正当性，可否给予其描述呢？不能：逆事实的两难困境导致更深的问题：1）为人们的处境间的关系负责任这一乏味的问题。2）当实际处境是一个机会因素时，那些非机会因素是不可确定的。
1） 区分：某人为她的良好处境所负的责任（如，作为她选择的结果）和某人对她的良好处境与别人的处境的关系所负的责任。
责任并不描述人们之间的关系模式。物质分配的模式如果不是一个机会问题那又是什么呢？纵使两个人都为他们各自的物资水准负责而不管这水准是否平等，他们之间的关系在某种程度上仍然是一个机会问题，因为他们都不必为对方的处境负责。论点从实际关系延及到逆事实的关系。 2）如果人们不当为他们各自的物资水准负责：如果那些他们所不当承担责任的因素被清除了，他们当为什么负责呢？机会均衡的目标并没有告诉我们从一种作为机会的分配相另一种作为机会的分配的转移。并不仅仅因为没有理由认为我们都为同样的事情负责，而且因为，就可能性而言，那些我们应为之负责的因素在许多情况下是不可确定的：认为某种因素在逆事实的条件下并非机会因素这种观点是缺乏普遍的、非独断的基础的。这不仅是一个认识论问题，责任概念本身在许多情况下并不能很确定地延伸这么远。
5、相关的问题
对责任的假设性选择描述的缺陷：因果关系的无成本性，非确定性。（与实际选择或控制相比较而言）。 使机会的影响均衡化的目标适用于回归原理，对某事负责要求对该事的原因负责。沿着合理的假定，回归原理使得任何责任都不可能。但这也不能为平均主义奠定基础。
罗莫尔对机会均等所作的描述也不能为平均主义提供一个基础。相反地，这种描述表明 ：对于那些为值得赞赏的生活方式作出了努力的人，我们可以如何回报他们；而我们是否赞同平均主义结构或模式，这取决于我们将什么看作值得赞赏的。
Feminism and the Objects of Justice
Alison Jaggar
Department of Philosophy
University of Colorado at Boulder, USA
Central to justice is the notion of moral balance, which philosophers often
express in terms of giving each her due. By this, they typically mean that
goods and evils should be distributed in quantities and qualities proportionate
to the desert of the recipients. Contemporary theories of social justice are
usually presented as proposing rival answers to the question:
1. What should count as just deserts? That is to say, according to what principle
should goods and evils be distributed in a just social system? In discussions
of so-called distributive justice, this question is generally interpreted
as asking for moral grounds capable of justifying state intervention to redistribute
material goods; in the context of corrective justice, the question is often
interpreted as one about which principles should determine the kinds of behavior
that deserve to be punished by law and the kinds of legal penalties that are
appropriate fitting. Feminists have proposed a variety of answers to the question
of what should count as just deserts but they have also raised an additional
questions, namely:
2. What are kinds or categories of things that should be distributed in a
just manner? I call this the question of the proper objects of justice and,
in the present paper, I show how recent work by feminist philosophers has
disclosed objects of justice ignored by most other mainstream philosophers.
I consider this disclosure to be one of the most significant contributions
made by feminism to Western understandings of social justice.
女权主义与正义之对象
艾莉森·迦格尔
美国科罗拉多大学哲学系
正义的核心是道德平衡的概念，哲学家常常用“将某人应得的给予某人”来表述这一概念。这一概念尤其意味着：善和恶的分配应当与接受者的功过相称。当代的正义理论一般表现为对下述问题提出竞争性的答案。
1）什么能被认作公正的功过标准？也就是说，在一个正义的社会系统中，善和恶的分布应当遵循什么原则？在讨论所谓分配的正义时，这一问题通常被解释为寻求一种道德根基，从而为国家对物质资源的再分配提供合法性；而在矫正性正义的背景中，这一问题又常常被解释为：应当由哪一种原则来确定该被法律惩罚的行为类型以及相适应的法律惩戒形式。在什么是公正的功过标准的问题上，女权主义者已经提出了范围广泛的答案，然而，他们还提出了一个特殊的问题，也就是： 2）那些应当被公正分配的事物类型是什么？我将之称为正义的恰当对象问题，并表明：女权主义哲学家最近的工作如何提出了正义的对象问题，而这一问题是被大多数其它主流哲学家所忽视的。我认为此问题的提出是女权主义者对理解西方社会正义观念最重要的贡献之一。
In Searching of Justice for Global Society:
A Comparison of Political Liberalism and Confucianism.
Dong-Jin Jang
Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea
This paper is primarily concerned with whether liberalism and Confucianism have overlapping ideas to be the ground of justice for global society. By comparing Rawls' Political Liberalism with Confucianism, which may be a decent doctrine in Rawls' term, this paper attempts to defend that the two political philosophies can agree on certain principles of justice for global decent doctrine in Rawls' term, this paper attempts to defend that the two political philosophies can agree on certain principles of justice for global society, despite their differences.
Confucianism is said to be the shared cultural background in the countries in East Asia. It is still a part of life unconsciously or consciously in this region. With the surprising economic growth and the recent economic crisis in East Asia, the active debates on Confucianism began to capture prudential attention from theorists. It is seriously reviewed to be a very persuasive factor to explain the economic crisis as well as the economic growth in the East Asian countries. While Confucianism has attraction in East Asia, liberalism is the most influential ideology worldwide. It greatly influences the new order of the world, and most countries response it positively or negatively. In this situation, it is worth comparing Rawls' political liberalism, which is specified running through his books, 'A Theory of Justice', 'Political Liberalism', and 'The Law of Peoples', with Confucian conception of justice.
In order to find the overlapping ideas to be grounds for global society, this paper tries to compare the two philosophies with following points.
First, I am going to analyze comparatively Rawls' political constructivism and Confucian intuitionism. Rawls uses political constructivism to construct the just principles for the basic structure of society. Confucian political philosophy stands upon an intuitionism that there is an objective reality of moral standards or values and that we can take a grasp of them through our reflections. In spite of difference, I am going to argue that these philosophical approaches to justice should be complementarily considered in producing the grounds for the global justice. I contend that even constructivism cannot avoid intuitionism to pave the basic bedrocks for just principles.
Second, I will compare the conceptions of the person. Rawls' political conception of the person is specified by two moral powers, one to form and revise one's own conception of the good and the other, the sense of justice, to live in fair terms of cooperation with others. Confucian conception of the person is represented by the perfect person, 'chun-tzu'(or the noble person). A person can become good through the cultivation of the innate four moral virtues, humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. In Confucianism, it is argued that this morally good person can make good politics. With all the different conceptions, I contend that the underlying ideas running underneath the two share the fundamental respect of persons which may provide the starting point for the just principles for global society.
Third, I am going to compare the conceptions of society. Rawls' conception of society is characterized by its ethical conflicts among the comprehensive philosophical, moral, and religious doctrines. Confucian conception of society is distinguished by its constant conflicts between powers without moral standards. These different conceptions of society lead to take opposite routes to the relationship between ethics and politics. In addition, it is important to compare Rawls' well-ordered democratic society with Confucian conception of an ideal society. Although these two conceptions of society are different, it is notable that both conceptions share one common goal to establish a good society by positing proper relations among the persons. Despite the different routes, this shared goal may be the ground for specifying the just principles for global society.
Noting these shared grounds, I attempt to defend that Confucianism and liberalism can agree on certain principles of justice guiding global society.
寻求全球社会的正义：政治自由主义和儒家思想的比较
Dong-jin Jang
韩国汉城Yonsei大学
本文主要关注的是：自由主义和儒家学说是否有共同的观念以作为全球社会的正义基础。通过比较罗尔斯的政治自由主义（这可以说是应用罗尔斯术语的一种较近的学说）和儒家学说，本文将为下述思想辩护：尽管存在种种差别，这两种政治哲学能在全球社会的某些正义原则上达成一致。
儒家学说被认为是东亚国家共同享有的文化背景。在这个地区，它仍然有意识或无意识地是人们生活的一部分。由于东亚地区惊人的经济增长和最近的经济危机，对儒家学说的热烈争论开始引起学界全面的关注。无论是对于东亚地区的经济增长还是经济危机，儒家思想都被严肃地看作是一种强烈的诱导因素。儒家学说在东亚地区有其吸引力，而自由主义却是全球范围内最有影响的意识形态。它极大地支配着世界的新秩序，绝大多数国家都或积极或消极地对之作出反应。在这种情况下，比较儒家的正义观念和罗尔斯的政治自由主义是有意义的，后者是在罗尔斯的一系列著作《正义论》、《政治自由主义》和《民众的法律》中得到论述的。
为了寻求能作为全球社会基础的共有观念，本文在下列要点上比较两种哲学。
首先，我将比较地分析罗尔斯的政治结构主义和儒家的直觉主义。罗尔斯使用政治结构主义来构成社会基本结构的正义原则。儒家的政治哲学则奠基于一种直觉主义基础上，这种直觉主义认为：道德标准和价值是一种客观的实在，我们能在沉思中直接把握到它。尽管有其区别，我将论证：为了构成全球正义的基础，这两种关于正义的哲学方法应当互补地得到考虑。我主张，如果没有直觉主义的话，结构主义不能为正义原则提供基础。
其次，我会比较人的概念。罗尔斯关于人的政治概念由两种道德能力来规定，一种就是形成和修正自身关于善的观念的道德能力，另一种是对正义的领悟，即对与别人公正相处状态的识别能力。儒家的人的观念由“至人”概念表现出来，即“君子”（或“圣贤”）。一个人能够通过对四种内在道德价值的修养而成为善，这四种内在道德价值即仁、义、礼、智。儒家学说认为：人在道德上的完善能导致政治上的完善。尽管这两个概念不同，我将论述：在人的观念的基础方面上这两个概念有着一致性，而这可以作为全球社会的正义原则的起点。
再次，我将比较社会这一概念。罗尔斯的社会概念关注的是在广泛不同的哲学的、道德的和宗教的信条之间的伦理冲突。而儒家的社会概念则注重的是在不涉及道德准则的权力之间的经常性的冲突。这些不同的社会概念导致在对伦理与政治的关系上不同的路线。此外，比较罗尔斯的“良好的民主社会”观念和儒家的理想社会的观念是很重要的。虽然这两种社会概念是不同的，值得注意的是，这两种概念有共同目标，即通过在人们之间确定一种适宜的关系来建构一个好的社会。尽管路线不同，这一共同分享的目标能作为基础明确规定全球社会的正义
原则。
通过关注上述共同分享的基础，我试图为这种思想辩护：儒家学说和自由主义在指导全球社会的某些正义原则上能达成一致。
Legitimate Foundation of Procedures in the Rule of Law: Justice or Rules?
Jiang Yi
Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China
It has been a committed principle by most of Western legists and philosophers of law that procedures in the rule of law should be one of presuppositions for pushing on the rule of law. However, there are different views among them about what should be the foundation for insuring the legitimacy of procedures in the rule of law. There have been various doctrines over the problem in the history of Western political ideas, which could be divided into two kinds: one is that the foundation should be justice and moral norms in the society and thus is justified in accordance with the justice. It was initialed by Plato’s Republic and further signed by different versions of Utopias. Rawls’ On Justice is a representation of the versions in modern time. The other is that all matters in human lives must be conditioned by rules and conventions that have been committed for long time. In this view, states are formed according to agreements that are achieved in order to avoid chaos and to keep harmony in the society; establishment of rule of law is aimed at guaranty to carry out those agreements. Accordingly the foundation of rule of law should be rules instead of justice in general sense. This view was represented by Aristotle’s political ideas at first, Hobbes and Lock’ s ones later. In modern time Heyke’s liberalism is a powerful imagine of the views. This shows a fundamental conflict between the two kinds of view: the legitimate foundation of procedures in rule of law should be justice or rules. Different answers to the question lead to different understandings of law supreme and of validity of law by legists and philosophers.
The significant principle of dealing with the matter is not confusion of the rules of law and democracy, law and morality. Democracy as a political goal is achieved only by the rules of law and not considered as a means for the rules of law. On the first hand democracy is not a means but an ideal way of life illustrating peopl